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INTRODUCTION
Partnership taxation is a disaster. Subchapter K, which contains the
rules governing the taxation of partners and partnerships,' suffers
from flaws that have wrought havoc on the government's ability to
tax one of our most rapidly increasing categories of business and
investment entities.2 Subchapter K's most longstanding affliction is
its commitment to flexibility. Since subchapter K's enactment in
1954, Congress has been steadfast in its desire that partnership tax be
flexible, enabling partners to structure their ventures in whatever
manner seems most sensible.4
But this grant of latitude in structuring partnerships is not without
cost. Congress has struggled to reconcile this flexibility with
subchapter K's other goals, such as equity. Subchapter K's flexibility
has also led to abuse.s Taken together, these problems have triggered
I See I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (2006). These rules govern all unincorporated entities with two
or more members, including limited liability companies ("LLCs"), that elect to be treated as
partnerships for federal income tax purposes. See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in
2006).
2 See Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, Partnership Returns, 2005, SOI BULL., Fall
2007, at 69, 70 fig.B, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05partnr.pdf. The number of
partnerships grew by 8.5% in 2005, the most recent year for which partnership return
information is available. Id. at 69. Indeed, the number of partnerships increased at an average
annual rate of 5.7% between 1995 and 2005. Id. This increase was due in large measure to the
explosive growth of LLCs. See id. at 75. For four consecutive years starting in 2002, LLCs grew
more than all other entity types, increasing by 15.4% in 2005. Id. Indeed, since 1995, the
number of LLCs has grown by more than 1100%. Id. (noting that 118,559 returns were filed by
LLCs in 1995 versus 1,465,223 returns filed by LLCs in 2005); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, PuB. No. JCX-48-08, TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES RELATING TO
SMALL BUsINESS AND CHOICE OF ENTITY 11 (2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-48-08
.pdf.
3 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68 Stat. 730, 68A Stat. 3.
4 See Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business Taxation:
A Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REV. 815, 821-22 (1992) ("A partnership
possesses the capacity to allow implementation, in rational ways, of the infinite imagination that
entrepreneurs demonstrate in arranging their economic affairs.").
5 See Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 TAX L. REv. 1,
1 (1990) ("The flexibility of subchapter K, one of its most celebrated features, has given
partners license to shift income and loss among themselves and dispose of assets while deferring
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another of subchapter K's afflictions-complexity. Over the years,
Congress and the Treasury have added myriad technical provisions to
subchapter K in an attempt to prevent abuse or promote equity. As a
consequence, subchapter K requires taxpayers who wish to do
business in the partnership form to navigate a grueling array of
technical provisions.6 And as the years pass, the level of complexity
continues to worsen.
Subchapter K nonetheless remains appealing to many taxpayers
because the enforcement resources dedicated to partnership taxation
have been woefully insufficient. Audit rates in subchapter K remain
low, and the temptation to play the audit lottery remains high.8 Thus,
recognition of gain in ways that are not otherwise possible under the income tax." (footnote
omitted)); see also Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future
Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 249, 250 (1999) [hereinafter Lokken, Future Without
Subchapter K] ("The flexibility of the original conduit model facilitated devices to shift income,
deductions, and other tax attributes from partner to partner and from property to property in
ways that Congress found unacceptable.").
6 See Foxman v. Comn'r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964) ("The distressingly complex and
confusing nature of the provisions of subchapter K present a formidable obstacle to the
comprehension of these provisions without the expenditure of a disproportionate amount of time
and effort even by one who is sophisticated in tax matters with many years of experience in the
tax field."); see also Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 251 ("The
cumulative result of all of this legislative and administrative activity is a system of such
complexity that full compliance is only theoretically possible.").
7 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2007 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE
STATISTICS 4 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/2008 enforcement.pdf. In 2008, the
Internal Revenue Service ("Service") examined 0.42% of all partnership returns (13,203
partnership returns examined out of 3,146,994 filed for the 2007 calendar year). Id. Since 1998,
the Service has examined an average of 0.34% of all partnership returns annually. Id. In
addition, with few exceptions, the percentage of partnership returns examined each year since
1998 has been lower than the percentage of any other type of income tax return. See id. The
only exception was S corporation returns for the 2003 through 2005 fiscal years, but the
difference was never larger than 0.07%. See id. (demonstrating that for 2003 through 2005, the
Service examined 0.35%, 0.26% and 0.33%, respectively, of all partnership returns, and it
examined 0.30%, 0.19% and 0.30%, respectively, of all S corporation returns); see also Lokken,
Future Without Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 252 ("[M]any tax practitioners believe that very
few IRS auditors of partnership returns understand enough of subchapter K to challenge
partnership accounting for items subject to the more complicated aspects of subchapter K ....
This perception diminishes taxpayers' incentives to try their best to comply in any but the
largest of transactions."); David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 335-36
(2006).
8 See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24
VA. TAX REV. 1, 26 n. 123 (2004) ("Mhe audit lottery heavily favors taxpayers investing in tax
shelters organized as partnerships because there is a low audit rate for partnerships. Many
practitioners we spoke to in Boston and New York have never had a tax shelter partnership
client audited by the Service other than family limited partnerships used in estate planning.");
James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV.
135, 161 (2002) ("The Service's shockingly low audit coverage makes the audit lottery an
irresistible attraction; it is not even a lottery, but rather a virtually sure thing." (footnote
omitted)); Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 252; see also George K Yin,
The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141, 174-201 (1999).
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for taxpayers with enough sophistication or financial resources to
exploit subchapter K's complexity, partnerships offer plentiful
opportunities to engage in strategic behavior. Indeed, many taxpayers
consider partnerships the perfect vehicle for tax shelter activity: the
rules are flexible, but also technical, and the entity is less likely to be
audited than its transactional counterparts.9
Thus, it is no surprise that partnerships played a central role in the
most recent generation of tax shelters.10 Enron, General Electric,
Colgate-Palmolive, and many other corporations all used partnerships
to structure abusive transactions during the last decade." Although
the government ultimately eliminated many of these specific abuses, 12
9 This Article adopts the following definition of a tax shelter: an abusive transaction "is a
transaction which is designed to technically comply with the letter of the law, but which
produces tax savings that are inappropriate to the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme
and inconsistent with the economic reality of the transaction." Cunningham & Repetti, supra
note 8, at 20; Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse ofAntiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership
Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 164 (2001). However, there is much disagreement
in the literature regarding the definition of a tax shelter. "Corporate tax shelters 'appear in the
guises of Proteus,' taking many different forms and utilizing many different structures. For this
reason, a single, comprehensive definition of corporate tax shelters is difficult to formulate."
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 11-12 (July 1999), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax
-policy/library/ctswhite.pdf (footnote omitted); see also Joseph Bankman, The New Market in
Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1776-77 (1999) [hereinafter Bankman, New
Market in Corporate Tax Shelters]; Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47,52-55 (2001); Eustice, supra note 8, at 158-60; David P. Hariton,
Essay, Kafka and the Tax Shelter, 57 TAX L. REV. 1 (2003); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths
About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55
TAX L. REV. 325, 328-32 (2002).
10 See IRS.gov, Partnership - Audit Technique Guide - Chapter 9 - Tax Shelters - The
Disclosure Regime, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/partnerships/article/0,,id= 134698,00.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2010) ("In recent years, there has been a continuous growth of the use of
partnerships in tax shelters."); see also Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 57-58
("[S]ubchapter K was the vehicle of choice for abusive transactions that the Treasury was
unable to address by adopting more rules.").
" See, e.g., TIFD II-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (General
Electric); ACM P'ship v. Comn'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (Colgate-Palmolive); STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PUB. No. JCS-3-03, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION
ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: VOLUME 1: REPORT 100-403 (2003), available at
http://www.jct.gov/s-3-03-voll.pdf (Enron); David Cay Johnston, Tax Moves by Enron Said to
Mystify the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at Cl (Enron). See generally DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 9, at 25-33; Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X Rated
Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 14, 1998, at 198.
12 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson & Lawrence Zelenak, Codification of General
Disallowance ofArtificial Losses, 122 TAX NOTES 1389 (2009); Pamela F. Olson, Now That
You've Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to Do With It? Observations from the Frontlines,
the Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So To Speak, 60 TAX LAw. 567, 567 (2007) [hereinafter
Olson, Observations from the Frontlines]; Jeremiah Coder, Korb Reflects on Long Tenure, Cites
Recruiting and Litigation Successes, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 22, 2008, 2008 TNT 246-3
(LEXIS) (recounting the view of Donald Korb, outgoing I.R.S. Chief Counsel, that the Treasury
has turned the comer on corporate tax shelters).
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tax shelters remain a perennial problem of the federal income tax
system, ebbing and flowing over the years with devastating effect.13
Most immediately, the cost of tax shelters is borne by the public at
large, with some estimates suggesting that corporations avoided
paying federal income taxes of roughly $10 billion in 1999, and that
such numbers grew dramatically thereafter.14 The non-monetary costs
of tax shelters are also destructive. Tax shelters create a perception
that the federal income tax system rewards the wealthy, the well
advised, and taxpayers who are sufficiently lucky or skilled to
discover new tax-saving techniques.15  In so doing, tax shelters
undermine the foundational notion that similarly situated taxpayers
should be treated similarly. And when the federal tax system's
integrity is compromised, taxpayers are less likely to comply with its
rules and are more likely to enter into abusive transactions.'6
There exists a growing modem literature analyzing tax shelters and
how to prevent future generations of abusive transactions. One strand
focuses on enforcement and disclosure regimes.17 Another examines
13 See Eustice, supra note 8, at 136 ("What has become increasingly clear to me, however,
is that while aggressive corporate tax planning may be a serious problem, it is not a new one. . .
14 See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 31; Cunningham & Repetti, supra
note 8, at 3; Novack & Saunders, supra note 11. The Government Accountability Office
estimates that in 1998, the monetary loss from tax shelters was between $13.6 and $17.3 billion.
See JANE G. GRAVELLE, ANTI-TAX-SHELTER AND OTHER REVENUE-RAISING TAX PROPOSALS
CONSIDERED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS 8 (2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs
-6773. The same study estimates cumulative losses from tax shelters between 1989 and 2003 to
be $85 billion. Id. Nonetheless, the true cost of tax shelters is difficult to quantify. See, e.g.,
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 31; Bankman, New Market in Corporate Tax
Shelters, supra note 9, at 1776; Canellos, supra note 9, at 48; Cunningham & Repetti, supra
note 8, at 3.
15 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 3 ("Corporate tax shelters breed
disrespect for the tax system-both by the people who participate in the tax shelter market and
by others who perceive unfairness. A view that well-advised corporations can and do avoid their
legal tax liabilities by engaging in these tax-engineered transactions may cause a 'race to the
bottom."'); Sheldon I. Banoff, The Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 827,
828-30 (1995) [hereinafter Banoff, Use and Misuse ofAnti-Abuse Rules].
16 See Margaret Milner Richardson, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks at the
ABA Tax Section Annual Meeting, reprinted in Full Text: Richardson's Speech to ABA Tax
Section Annual Meeting, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 6, 1994, 94 TNT 157-67 (LEXIS)
[hereinafter Richardson Remarks] ("I am concerned that voluntary compliance with the tax law
can be severely damaged by the perception that taxpayers with sophisticated advisors are able to
creatively use the tax laws to their undue advantage. If some taxpayers can find ways to
circumvent the law, then compliance will be seriously jeopardized."); Letter from Daniel
Halperin, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec'y (Tax Pol'y), Dep't
of the Treasury (July 26, 1994), reprinted in Halperin Expresses Support For Partnership
Antiabuse Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, July 26, 1994, 94 TNT 152-36 (LEXIS) [hereinafter
Halperin Comments].
17 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1629 (2009); Canellos, supra note 9; Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystifying
Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L. REV. 289 (2002); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices:
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substantive law, particularly the various judicial doctrines applied in
challenging tax shelter transactions.18 Absent from the literature,
however, is much discussion of subchapter K itself. Considering its
unique standing as the preeminent breeding ground for tax shelters,
one would expect a more spirited dialogue among scholars and
practitioners about the relationship between subchapter K and tax
shelters.
Perhaps the reason for this omission is a grim perception that
subchapter K is beyond repair. From this viewpoint, there is only one
question that really matters-should Congress kill subchapter K?
Commentators have occasionally addressed this question,19 but
Congress is not yet prepared to consider subchapter K's fate. Thus,
fundamental reform of partnership taxation is unlikely to happen
anytime soon.
With the most pressing question about subchapter K indefinitely
tabled, we must consider second-best alternatives that might prevent
the tax shelters that have become endemic to partnership taxation.
This Article suggests that Treasury regulation section 1.701-2,
commonly referred to as the partnership anti-abuse rule ("PAAR"), 20
may provide subchapter K with the support it so desperately requires.
The PAAR, in basic terms, authorizes the Internal Revenue Service
("Service") to recast a partnership transaction if the transaction has a
principal purpose of substantially reducing the partners' federal
income tax liability in a manner inconsistent with the intent of
subchapter K.2 1 The PAAR's goal is simple-to remind taxpayers that
the literal language of subchapter K cannot be manipulated to
generate results contrary to the legislative intent underlying
Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009); David A.
Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73 (2001)
[hereinafter Weisbach, Failure of Disclosure].
18 See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Essay, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005) [hereinafter Chirelstein & Zelenak,
Search for a Silver Bullet]; Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 12; Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither
Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
19 See GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECr: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES REPORTERS' STUDY 73-76, 80 (Am.
Law Inst. Draft 1999) [hereinafter, ALI, 1999 REPORTERS' STUDY]; see also Curtis J. Berger,
W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REV. 105, 108 (1991); Gunn, supra note 9, at 174;
Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX LAW. 229, 238
(1998); Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 285; Philip F. Postlewaite, I
Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to Praise It, 54 TAX LAW. 451, 462 (2001); Yin, supra note 8,
at 165.
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995).
21 Id. § 1.701-2(b). The PAAR also includes a second anti-abuse nmle, referred to as the
"abuse of entity rule." See id. § 1.701-2(e). For discussion of the abuse of entity rule, see infra
note 113.
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subchapter K. To many observers, the PAAR seemed self-evident, but
the Treasury feared that subchapter K's unique combination of
flexibility, complexity, and low enforcement caused some taxpayers
to believe that partnerships were special and, thus, not subject to the
tax system's first principles.22
The PAAR's short history is as colorful and intriguing as any soap
opera.23 The Treasury proposed the PAAR in 1994,24 and practitioners
responded venomously, displaying a level of anger and outrage rarely
seen in the tax world.25 In response, the Treasury significantly
reworked the PAAR before its final issuance six months later.26
To this day, the PAAR remains controversial, drawing visceral
reactions from scholars and practitioners alike.27 But the passion
stirred by the PAAR is remarkably puzzling because the regulation
has had virtually no impact on subchapter K. Indeed, the PAAR is a
complete failure. Practitioners, the Service, and the courts regularly
disregard the regulation when structuring and analyzing transactions.
And despite the PAAR's prohibitions, a new generation of tax
shelters has proliferated at exorbitant public cost.28
The PAAR might thus seem like an improbable candidate to
sustain subchapter K until Congress considers fundamental reform of
the partnership tax rules. Yet that is precisely what this Article
suggests. Specifically, the Treasury should revise the PAAR and
return the regulation to its roots as a broad anti-abuse rule. In doing
so, the Treasury would finally free the regulation to combat the
abusive partnership transactions that justified its issuance sixteen
22 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581, 25,582 (May 17, 1994). In her
inimitable style, Lee Sheppard described this form of "partnership tax exceptionalism" as
follows: "A partnership is a magic circle. Anything that is dropped into it becomes exempt from
taxation. Forever ... . Adherents to this view of subchapter K understand the word 'flexible' to
mean that you can do absolutely anything you want without incurring tax." Lee A. Sheppard,
Partnerships, Consolidated Returns and Cognitive Dissonance, 63 TAX NOTES 936, 936 (1994)
[hereinafter Sheppard, Cognitive Dissonance].
2 Cf. Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L. REV.
365, 365-66 (2003) [hereinafter Lokken, As the Partnership World Turns].
24 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581.
2 See infra Part I.B.2.
26 See infra Part LC.
2 See, e.g., Shop Talk, Misuse of the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule: New ILM lacks
Reasoned Analysis, 104 J. TAX'N 376 (2006) [hereinafter Shop Talk, Misuse of Partnership
Anti-Abuse Rule] (discussing the IRS's increasingly liberal application of the final PAAR);
Shop Talk, Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules: Agents Will Apply, Courts May Deny, 106 J. TAX'N
314 (2007) [hereinafter Shop Talk, Agents Will Apply, Courts May Deny] (noting the
uncertainty surrounding the final PAAR's validity); Lee A. Sheppard, Government Officials
Discuss Partnership, Shelter Issues, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 4, 2007, 2007 TNT 107-1
(LEXIS) (analyzing the final PAAR's structural defects and practitioners' dissatisfaction with
the regulation).
28 See infra Part LE.
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years ago. Likewise, there is little downside to revitalizing the PAAR.
At a minimum, revising the regulation would send an important signal
regarding the Treasury's and the Service's continued commitment to
preventing abuse in subchapter K.
Part I provides a uniquely comprehensive history of the PAAR,
tracing its journey from proposed regulation to final regulation to
failed regulation. The dynamic relationship between the Treasury and
practitioners shaped the PAAR's story, and this part highlights the
interplay of these two oppositional forces. Part II explores the causes
of the PAAR's distinctive failure and what lessons may be learned.
Although numerous factors contributed to the PAAR's failure, the
period between the regulation's proposal and finalization was
transformative, corrupting the PAAR beyond repair. Correcting the
mistakes of that six-month period is the subject of Part 1H, which
sketches the path to a better PAAR and, in turn, a better subchapter K.
Part m suggests that the Treasury streamline the PAAR, thus
liberating the regulation to effectively challenge abusive partnership
transactions. Part III concludes by examining several objections to
revising the PAAR, ultimately finding that such objections are
premature and factually uncertain. What is certain, however, is
subchapter K's pressing crisis and the final PAAR's inability to
prevent the proliferation of tax shelters. It seems very possible, if not
likely, that revising the PAAR could be part of the solution.
I. HISTORY OF THE PARTNERSHIP ANTI-ABUSE RULE
The PAAR is unique in the federal income tax system,
confounding its proponents and opponents alike. The Treasury
proposed the regulation in hopes of halting the proliferation of
abusive partnership transactions.29 Practitioners responded with
unprecedented venom, and argued that the Treasury should withdraw
the regulation.30 But they failed in this campaign against the PAAR;
the Treasury issued the final regulation six months later.3' Still, these
practitioners set in motion a chain of events that ultimately led to the
PAAR's demise. Most importantly, the firestorm surrounding the
PAAR's proposal led the Treasury to make numerous changes to the
regulation that are reflected in its final form. These changes were not
for the better, shackling the PAAR and severely limiting its efficacy.
The PAAR failed, as the regulation has had very little impact on
subchapter K or the spread of tax shelters.
29 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581.
3o See infra Part LB.2.
31 T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109.
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A. The Problem
Tax shelters are an obvious and serious problem for the federal
income tax system. So long as the law requires taxpayers to share
their annual income with the federal government, taxpayers will look
for means to reduce this obligation. Because of subchapter K's unique
dysfunction, it is a fertile ground for tax shelter transactions.
Subchapter K prizes flexibility,32 and its provisions offer taxpayers
great latitude in structuring their ventures to achieve various goals,
including tax reduction. Coupled with such flexibility is complexity.
Subchapter K includes a formidable patchwork of technical
provisions responding to abuses and inequities caused by the regime's
commitment to flexibility. To make matters worse, the enforcement
resources dedicated to subchapter K are insufficient.33 Audit rates are
low and detection rates are even lower due to complexity, layering,
and taxpayer concealment strategies.34 Taken together, these flaws
create a playground for those who engage in transactions that comply
with subchapter K's literal language, yet result in tax consequences
that Congress did not contemplate.35
By the early 1990s, it was evident that the Treasury's traditional
arsenal of anti-tax shelter weapons-judicial doctrines, administrative
guidance, regulations, and statutory provisions-had not stemmed the
tide of abusive partnership transactions.36 For example, the Service
often challenged abusive transactions based on various judicial
doctrines, which serve as overlays to the literal language of the Code
and regulations. These doctrines require, inter alia, that transactions
have economic substance37 and a business purpose apart from tax
savings.
32 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
33 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section,
Report on the Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, reprinted in NYBSA Submits Report on
Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 1, 1994, 94 TNT 130-34 (LEXIS)
[hereinafter NYSBA Report].
3 See NYSBA Report, supra note 33 ("There is a low audit rate in the partnership area,
and agents often are inexperienced in sophisticated partnership tax matters."); see also
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 26 n. 123; Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K, supra
note 5, at 252.
35 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,582; see also Cunningham & Repetti,
supra note 8, at 2; Lokken, As the Partnership World Turns, supra note 23, at 366.
36 Indeed, at the ABA Tax Section Annual Meeting in August 1994, Margaret Milner
Richardson, then Commissioner of the Service, made the following observation: "Wall Street
bankers regularly market partnership tax plays, rumors of clever transactions abound, and entire
seminar presentations focus on strategies for 'running amok' in the area. Apparently for some,
partnerships have become the tax shelters of the '90s." Richardson Remarks, supra note 16.
3 See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see
also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). In basic terms, the economic
substance doctrine provides that a transaction will not be respected if it fails to result in a
4092010]
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The Service's application of these general tax doctrines to contexts
involving subchapter K, however, was problematic. Each judicial
doctrine required intensive analysis of a transaction's facts and
circumstances, and there was scant authority applying these doctrines
to partnership transactions.3 9  From the Service's perspective,
litigating a partnership transaction involved the risk that a court
would be unwilling to extend the relevant judicial doctrine into a
context as technical and complex as partnership taxation, particularly
when the transaction was structured in literal compliance with
subchapter K. Under such circumstances, the Service was overly
hesitant to litigate partnership tax shelters, opting instead for the
greater certainty of a settlement. 40 But the failure to develop
meaningful change in the taxpayer's economic position apart from federal income tax
consequences. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5,
21 (2000); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235,
235 (1999). Different courts have interpreted the economic substance doctrine differently.
Compare, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir.
2001) ("This economic substance doctrine, also called the sham-transaction doctrine, provides
that a transaction ceases to merit tax respect when it has 'no economic effects other than the
creation of tax benefits.' Even if the transaction has economic effects, it must be disregarded if
it has no business purposes and its motive is tax avoidance." (footnote omitted)), with ACM
P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[Tjhese distinct aspects of the economic
sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step analysis,' but rather represent
related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient
substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes."), and Rice's
Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) ("To treat a transaction as a
sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purpose other than
obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic
substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists."). For a more detailed discussion
of the economic substance doctrine, see BORIS I. BrrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND Gl~rs 1 4.3.4A (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. II 2004)
[hereinafter BHTTKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION].
38 The business purpose doctrine requires that, to be respected, a transaction have a
business purpose other than tax avoidance. See Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810-11. For a more detailed
discussion of the business purpose doctrine, see BrTTKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, supra note 37, at 14.3.4.
3 See NYSBA Report, supra note 33 ("The common law authority is very general in
nature, and there is little case law involving the application of such doctrines in the partnership
context. As a result, a taxpayer may have a respectable argument that the common law doctrines
do not apply to a particular transaction that literally complies with Subchapter K, and an agent
may tend to be reluctant to respond with common law authority that does not directly involve
partnerships.").
4 See id. As the New York State Bar Association Tax Section observed:
Taxpayers engaging in these transactions . . . often have the perception that the
Service tends to settle on a basis favorable to taxpayers rather than litigate. Likewise,
taxpayers know that penalties are unlikely because of their literal compliance with
the statute and regulations, and as a result believe (often with considerable
justification) that even with an unfavorable settlement they will generally end up
better off than if they had not engaged in the abusive transaction.
Id.; see also Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 28.
WHAT'S INA NAME
precedent applying the judicial doctrines to subchapter K diminished
their utility as effective weapons against abusive partnership
transactions.
Administrative responses, such as rulings and regulations, were
similarly inadequate to stop abusive partnership transactions. The
Treasury can only challenge an abusive transaction once it has been
noticed and, thus, significant time lags hampered the Treasury's
ability to respond to tax shelters. Years often passed between the
introduction of a new sheltering technique and the Treasury's
discovery of it.4 ' Developing a viable regulatory response and
ensuring that it was procedurally proper also required a significant
time investment.4 2 As a result, the Treasury remained years behind the
market.43 And by the time the Treasury could react, the market had
moved on to the next tax shelter, leaving the Treasury back where it
started-hopelessly behind the market.
Time lags, however, were not the only factor working against the
Treasury. The Treasury's ad hoc responses were typically
prospective, only applying to transactions entered into after the
effective date of the applicable regulation or ruling." These effective
date provisions sent several counterproductive signals to taxpayers,
thereby contributing to the growth of partnership tax shelters. First,
they created an incentive for taxpayers to complete as many
transactions as possible, as early as possible.4 5 Second, prospective
application led taxpayers to believe that any transaction completed
prior to the ruling or regulation's effective date would ultimately be
respected if litigated.46
41 See NYSBA Report, supra note 33 ("[T]hese attempts are inevitably slow in coming,
thereby allowing abusive transactions to occur on a large scale before the door is shut. The delay
occurs because the Service often does not become aware of a new form of transaction until
some time after it is created. . . ."); Halperin Comments, supra note 16 ("[Tlhe Treasury and the
IRS are frequently unaware of abusive transactions until they have been carried out for some
time. Practitioners do their best to conceal their plans.").
42 See Halperin Comments, supra note 16; NYSBA REPORT, supra note 33; Letter from
Peter L. Faber, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, to Margaret Milner Richardson,
Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Aug. 12, 1994), reprinted in Faber Offers Views on
Partnership Antiabuse Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, 94 TNT 167-9 (LEXIS)
[hereinafter Faber Comments].
43 As Michael Thomson, Acting Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, noted, "[tihis Treasury
has decided we are no longer going to play the catch-up game . . . ." Lee A. Sheppard,
Partnership Antiabuse Rule: Dirty Minds Meet Mrs. Gregory, 64 TAX NOTES 295, 295 (1994)
[hereinafter Sheppard, Dirty Mindsl.
44 See Halperin Comments, supra note 16; NYSBA Report, supra note 33.
4s NYSBA Report, supra note 33 (noting that prospective effective date provisions
"appear[ed] to put a premium on being the first to market a 'secret' new transaction and to close
as many transactions of the same type as possible before the Service discover[ed] and act[ed] on
the form of transaction").
.6 See id. (arguing that prospective effective date provisions "may confer an aura of
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Further, the Treasury's responses typically targeted one abuse at a
time. They followed subchapter K's traditional rulemaking model,
resulting in additional layers of complex, technical rules. Thus, the
Treasury's ad hoc responses tended to replicate, rather than resolve,
many of subchapter K's most troublesome traits.47
Congressional efforts to combat abusive transactions were plagued
by similar difficulties.4 8 The time between the initial marketing of a
sheltering technique and Congress's enactment of a specific
anti-abuse provision could be significant.49 Like the Treasury,
Congress also followed an ad hoc process that typically resulted in
narrowly targeted, highly technical statutory provisions.
Even worse, Congress's and the Treasury's responses contributed
to subchapter K's downward spiral. Each response added yet another
layer of complexity to subchapter K.50 This complexity, in turn,
created opportunities for strategic behavior, providing a roadmap for
the next abusive transaction."' And when Congress or the Treasury
would respond to this new tax shelter, the cycle would simply begin
anew.
Nowhere was the vulnerability of the Treasury's arsenal more
apparent than in the critical link between the law and the tax shelter-
tax opinions. Participants in abusive partnership transactions typically
required a tax opinion, and the Treasury believed that many of the
practitioners writing such opinions increasingly focused on the
technical provisions of subchapter K and the resulting loopholes,
rather than on the foundational principles of the federal income tax
system.52 As a result, practitioners structuring partnership transactions
validity on transactions completed before the Service's response").
47 See Halperin Comments, supra note 16; NYSBA Report, supra note 33.
48 See Letter from Joseph Bankman, Professor, Stanford Law Sch., to Internal Revenue
Serv. (July 1, 1994), reprinted in Stanford Professor Rebuts Criticisms of Partnership Antiabuse
Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, July 20, 1994, 94 TNT 140-33 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Bankman
Comments]; Eustice, supra note 8, at 141.
4 See Bankman Comments, supra note 48 ("One obvious disadvantage to the legislative
approach is that it gives taxpayers a multi-year window in which to 'cash in' on even the most
egregious tax-driven transactions, so long as those transactions are supported by the literal
language of one or more statutes.").
5o See sources cited supra note 47.
51 See Richardson Remarks, supra note 16 ("As all of you know from experience, precise,
mechanical rules cannot possibly cover all conceivable situations. Moreover, such rules tend to
be the oil fields into which the perennial loophole seekers punch holes looking for a gusher.").
52 See Official Expresses IRS' Resolve to Finalize Anti-Abuse Rule, Attacks Comments on
Rules, Daily Tax Report (BNA), at Dll (Oct. 14, 1994). ("Explaining why IRS and Treasury
proposed the regulations, [IRS Deputy Associate Chief Counsel Monte] Jackel said there has
been 'a failure on the part of some' practitioners to ask themselves certain basic and
fundamental questions about the intent of the tax law when undertaking certain transactions.");
Sheppard, Dirty Minds, supra note 43, at 296.
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lost sight of the line separating legitimate tax planning from
impermissible tax sheltering. This problem was best articulated by
Margaret Milner Richardson, then Commissioner of the Service: "At
times, the tax law has become so complex that mechanical rules have
caused some tax lawyers to lose sight of the fact that their
stock-in-trade as lawyers should be sound judgment, not an ability to
recall an obscure subparagraph and manipulate its language to derive
unintended tax benefits.""
In the Treasury's view, if the tax consequences of a partnership
transaction were too good to be true, then they were precisely that-
too good to be true.54 But the Treasury lacked any legal tool that
could reliably cause taxpayers to forgo a partnership transaction when
its results, although in compliance with subchapter K's literal
language, were too good to be true. Thus, the Treasury needed a new
tool to combat the proliferation of abusive transactions within
subchapter K. It had to be nimble enough to challenge partnership
transactions in a constantly evolving market, broad enough to
counterbalance subchapter K's overly technical rules, and strong
enough to compel the magicians practicing within subchapter K to
keep a safe distance from abusive transactions.
The Treasury's choice was the PAAR, a general anti-abuse rule
that would govern all partnership transactions. The PAAR's goal was
simple-to remind taxpayers that literal compliance with subchapter
K was necessary but not sufficient. Partnership transactions also had
to satisfy the foundational principals that overlay the entire federal
income tax system, including subchapter K.5 '
53 Richardson Remarks, supra note 16.
54 See Sheppard, Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 22, at 943 ("[Tax Legislative Counsel
Glen] Kohl joked that he wished to write a rule saying 'if it's too good to be true, it isn't.' The
new style of drafting should, he ventured, allow lawyers to be lawyers again-to be paid for
using their judgment and ability to see the big picture, rather than for being technicians. The era
of the technician, he hoped, will end."); Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Antiabuse Rule Produces
Anticlimactic Hearing, 3 TAx. PRAC. & CONTROVERSIES 333, 335 (1994) [hereinafter Sheppard,
Anticlimactic Hearing] ("The regulation is simply a reminder that transactions that everyone
knows are too good to be true are too good to be true." (quoting Michael Schler, chairman of
the New York State Bar Association Tax Section)); see also Faber Comments, supra note 42
("[I]t is appropriate to place a general anti-abuse rule in the regulation. Such a regulatory
provision reminds practitioners and taxpayers that technical rules must be applied with
judgement [sic] and that results that look as if they are too good to be true are likely not to come
about.").
ss See Sheppard, Dirty Minds, supra note 43, at 296; see also Cunningham & Repetti,
supra note 8, at 33; Richardson Remarks, supra note 16 ("These anti-abuse provisions are
designed to inform taxpayers and practitioners that a literal application of a rule to achieve a
result that is inconsistent with the applicable statute or regulatory principle will not be respected.
Taxpayers should then be able to resolve tax issues by determining the proper result based on
general principles, rather than by parsing through detailed rules to derive a mechanical result
based on a literal reading of the regulation.").
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B. The Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule
1. The Proposed Regulation
On May 17, 1994, the Treasury proposed the PAAR.s6 The
proposed regulation set forth the following anti-abuse rule:
[I]f a partnership is formed or availed of in connection with a
transaction or series of related transactions . . . with a
principal purpose of substantially reducing the present value
of partners' aggregate federal tax liability in a manner that is
inconsistent with the intent subchapter K, the Commissioner
can disregard the form of the transaction.5 7
The Treasury defined the intent of subchapter K as permitting
"taxpayers to conduct business for joint economic profit through a
flexible arrangement that accurately reflects the partners' economic
agreement without incurring an entity-level tax."5 But the proposed
PAAR placed an explicit limit on this flexibility. Subchapter K was
not intended to allow partnerships to structure transactions that were
inconsistent with the partners' underlying economic arrangement or
that avoided the purposes of other Code provisions.59
The Treasury, however, provided little guidance about determining
whether a transaction violated the proposed PAAR. The regulation
provided that a substantial reduction in the partners' federal income
tax liability, standing alone, would not trigger application of the
regulationi 0 The Service could only recast a transaction if the
substantial reduction in tax liability was also contrary to the intent of
subchapter K.6  Otherwise, the proposed PAAR was silent, simply
stating that the Service should take account of all relevant facts and
circumstances in determining whether a transaction violated the
regulation.62
56 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581 (May 17, 1994).
-' Id. § 1.701-2(b), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583. If a transaction violated the proposed PAAR,
the Service was authorized to take any of the following remedial measures:
(1) disregard the purported partnership in whole or part; (2) decline to treat one of the purported
partners as a partner; (3) treat the partners as owning their respective shares of partnership assets
directly; (4) adjust the methods of accounting employed by the partnership or a partner;
(5) reallocate or disregard items of income, gain loss, deduction or credit; or (6) otherwise
preclude any intended tax treatment. Id. § 1.701-2(b)(ly-(6), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583.
58 Id. § 1.701-2(a), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583.
59 Id.
60 Id. § 1.701-2(c), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583.
61 Id. § 1.701-2(b), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583.
62 Id. § 1.701-2(c), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583.
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The proposed PAAR applied for all purposes of the Code, and it
did not supersede any of the judicial doctrines otherwise applicable to
a transaction.63 To illustrate its operation, the Treasury included four
examples in the proposed regulation-three involving transactions
complying with the regulation and one violating it.64
Perhaps anticipating the tax community's opposition, the Treasury
specifically delineated the proposed regulation's intended scope.6 5
According to the Treasury, the PAAR "primarily will affect a
relatively small number of abusive large partnership transactions and
reflects [the] Treasury's and the IRS's commitment to preventing
those abuses from undermining the intent of subchapter K."6 6
2. The Reaction-The Fury of the Tax Practitioners
"I'm gonna have a heart attack. You can print that."67 This was a
common practitioner reaction to the proposed PAAR. It would be
hard to exaggerate the vitriol generated by the regulation's proposal.68
One practitioner described the proposed PAAR as the "greatest
derogation of executive authority since Watergate." 6 9 Another posited
that the proposed regulation would cause "nuclear winter [to] descend
upon the joint venture profit-oriented partnership." 7 0 In written
comments, practitioners described the proposed PAAR in myriad
63 Id. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,582.
- Id. § 1.701-2(e), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583-84.
65 See infra Part I.B.2.
66 Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,582. Government officials expressed this
sentiment on numerous occasions. For instance, in remarks prepared for the ABA Tax Section
Annual Meeting in August 1994, Commissioner Richardson stated that "[wie also made it very
clear in the regulation's preamble, and in subsequent discussions, that the regulation is not
intended to interfere with the use of partnerships in ordinary business ventures, but is instead
designed to curb the activities of a relatively small number of abusive partnerships." Richardson
Remarks, supra note 16.
67 Sheppard, Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 22, at 936 (quoting Sanford C. Presant,
chairman of the ABA Tax Section Partnerships Committee, describing his reaction to the
issuance of the proposed PAAR).
6 Interestingly, practitioners' fierce response to the proposed PAAR made a strong
impression on several influential members of Congress-Representative Bill Archer, the
incoming chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Senator Bob Packwood, the
incoming chair of the Senate Finance Committee. Representative Archer and Senator Packwood
sent a sharply worded letter to Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen regarding the wisdom of the
proposed PAAR. See Letter from Rep. Bill Archer & Sen. Bob Packwood to Lloyd Bentsen,
Sec'y of the Treasury (Dec. 16, 1994), reprinted in Archer, Packwood Caution Treasury on
Partnership Antiabuse Rule, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Dec. 21, 1994, 94 TNT 249-6 (LEXIS).
69 Robert J. Wells et al., ABA Tax Section Meeting: Subchapter K Antiabuse Reg. Sparks
Heated Reactions, 63 TAX NOTEs 933, 934 (1994).
70 Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearings on Partnerships, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 29,
1994, 94 TNT 147-18 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Partnership Hearing] (testimony of Michael Lux of
Deloitte & Touche).
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colorful ways, likening it to a meat cleaver,7 ' an atomic bomb,n and a
generally blunderbuss approach to rulemaking. 73
Although practitioners claimed to support the Treasury's efforts to
combat tax shelters,74 they identified a seemingly endless number of
problems with the proposed PAAR. Almost unanimously,
practitioners called for the Treasury to withdraw the regulation.
71 Letter from Michael E. Schaff & Jerome Busch, Orange County Bar Ass'n Tax'n
Section, to Internal Revenue Serv. (June 30, 1994), reprinted in Orange County Bar Association
Criticizes Partnership Antiabuse Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, June 30, 1994, 94 TNT 142-40
(LEXIS) [hereinafter Orange County Bar Ass'n Comments] ("We recommend use of an
administrative scalpel, and only when necessary. We protest the meat cleaver that the Service is
attempting to use in the form of the Proposed Regulation.").
72 Florida Bar Section of Tax'n, Comments Concerning Proposed Treas. Reg. Section
1.701-2 Pertaining to the Recharacterization of Certain Partnership Transactions, reprinted in
Florida Bar Committee Callfor Antiabuse Rule's Overhaul, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 22, 1994,
1994 TNT 142-41 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Florida Bar Ass'n Comments] ("The adoption of
proposed regulation section 1.701-2 to attack perceived abuses involving a 'small number of
large partnership transactions' is akin to using an atomic bomb to perform delicate brain
surgery.").
7 See Letter from Kenneth Zuckerbrot, Ross & Hardies, to Internal Revenue Serv. (May
17, 1994), reprinted in Attorney Criticizes 'Blunderbluss Approach' of Partnership Antiabuse
Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, May 17, 1994,94 TNT 111-25 (LEXIS).
74 See, e.g., ABA Section of Tax'n, Comments Concerning Proposed Regulation Under
Section 701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, reprinted in ABA Tax Section Members Say
Antiabuse Rule is Not a Valid Exercise of IRS Authority, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 1, 1994, 94
TNT 146-50 (LEXIS) [hereinafter ABA Comments] ("The authors are supportive of the purpose
of this regulation project, which is to curb abusive tax avoidance transactions."); Federal Tax'n
Comm. of the Chicago Bar Ass'n, Comments on Proposed Regulation Section 1.701-2
Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, reprinted in Chicago Bar Calls Partnership Antiabuse Rule
Invalid, Urges Withdrawal, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 30, 1994, 94 TNT 139-61 (LEXIS)
[hereinafter Chicago Bar Ass'n Comments] ("Although the Federal Taxation Committee of the
Chicago Bar Association . . . strongly supports the proposition that abusive partnership
transactions must be prevented, the Committee believes ... that the Proposed Regulation should
be withdrawn."); Tax'n Section, Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Comments Concerning
Proposed Treasury Regulation Section 1.701-2, reprinted in Los Angeles County Bar Urges
Withdrawal of Antiabuse Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, July 22, 1994, 94 TNT 151-40 (LEXIS)
[hereinafter Los Angeles Bar Ass'n Comments] ("We understand that Treasury and the Internal
Revenue Service are legitimately concerned about certain partnership transactions without
economic substance that have been promoted as vehicles for tax reduction.. . . [But] we believe
that there are sufficient statutory and judicial authorities already available."); Letter from
Sheldon I. Fink et al., Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, to Internal Revenue Serv. (June 7,
1994), reprinted in Partnership Antiabuse Reg. Will Have 'Chilling Effect' on Legitimate
Transactions, Attorneys Say, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 15, 1994, 94 TNT 115-16 (LEXIS)
[hereinafter Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal Comments] ("These criticisms notwithstanding,
we are sympathetic to the IRS' stated concern of limiting 'abusive' transactions which are based
on Subchapter K of the Code . . . .").
7 Although a distinct minority, several commentators supported the Treasury's issuance
of the proposed PAAR. Most notably, the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association
submitted a generally favorable report on the regulation. See NYSBA Report, supra note 33.
Additionally, a very small number of practitioners and academics submitted comments in
support of the proposed PAAR. See Bankman Comments, supra note 48; Letter from N. Jerold
Cohen, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, to Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec'y (Tax Pol'y), Dep't
of the Treasury (July 1, 1994), reprinted in Cohen Supports Partnership Antiabuse Regulation,
TAX NOTES TODAY, July 1, 1994, 94 TNT 135-35 (LEXIS); Faber Comments, supra note 42;
Halperin Comments, supra note 16; Letter from Rebecca S. Rudnick, Professor, Boston Univ.
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a. Validity
Many practitioners believed the Treasury exceeded its rulemaking
authority when it proposed the PAAR. The Treasury did not issue the
proposed PAAR pursuant to any specific statutory authorization in
subchapter K; rather, it issued the PAAR pursuant to the general
authorization of Section 7805(a),76 which allows the Treasury to
"prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of
the Code.77 For objecting practitioners, nothing in the history of
subchapter K evinced Congress's intent to supplement the literal
language of the Code with a broad anti-abuse rule like the proposed
PAAR.7 8
Sch. of Law, to Internal Revenue Serv. (June 29, 1994), reprinted in Boston University
Professor Praises Antiabuse Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, June 29, 1994, 94 TNT 139-69
(LEXIS).
76 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581 (May 17, 1994).
77 I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006). Regulations issued under Section 7805(a) are referred to as
interpretive regulations. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 37,
at [ 110.4.2. In contrast, regulations issued pursuant to a specific statutory authorization are
referred to as legislative regulations. For a useful discussion of both interpretive and legislative
regulations, see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3.02[3][a]-[b] (rev.
2d ed. 2002 & Supp. I 2009).
78 Much like subchapter K, judicial deference to interpretive regulations is a muddled area
of the tax law. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Legislative Grants of
Regulatory Authority, reprinted in NYSBA Tax Section Comments on Legislative Grants of
Regulatory Authority, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 3, 2006, 2006 TNT 215-22 (LEXIS)
(discussing the substantial uncertainty surrounding judicial deference to interpretive
regulations); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1537, 1556-63 (2006). Although a detailed discussion of the
proper level of deference that should be afforded to interpretive regulations is beyond the scope
of this Article, a brief summary of the two primary approaches might be useful. Under the
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the validity of a regulation is determined by applying a two-part analysis. 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984). First, a court must consider whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. Id. at 842. If it has, then the courts and the Treasury must give effect to
Congress's unambiguously expressed intent. Id. at 842-43. On the contrary, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the question at issue, then the court must determine whether
the regulation is a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. For examples of the
PAAR's analysis under the Chevron standard, see Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at
50-55 (concluding that the final PAAR is valid) and WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS T 1.05[5] (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
McKEE ET AL., TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS] (concluding that the final PAAR
is invalid). The alternative deference standard, which derives from National Muffler Dealer's
Association, Inc. v. United States, provides that a regulation will be upheld if found to
implement a congressional mandate in some reasonable manner. 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979).
That is, the regulation must harmonize the statute's origin, purpose, and plain language. Id. at
477. Additionally,
[a] regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional
intent. If the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved
merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation has
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The Treasury issued the proposed PAAR under Section 701, but
many practitioners argued that, read literally, the regulation failed to
interpret or clarify this section. Indeed, these practitioners believed
that the regulation had little direct connection with Section 701,79
which provides that partners, rather than partnerships, are subject to
tax in their individual capacities for the entity's income.80 In the view
of many practitioners, the connection between Section 701 and the
proposed PAAR was tenuous at best and, therefore, the proposed
PAAR simply could not be understood as a proper interpretation of
Section 701.
Additionally, many practitioners maintained that the proposed
PAAR, with its unprecedented breadth, impermissibly overrode
subchapter K's literal language."' Specifically, the proposed
been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's
interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation
during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.
Id. For an example of the PAAR's analysis under the National Muffler standard, see ABA
Comments, supra note 74.
7 See Letter from Sheldon I. Banoff, Katten Muchin & Zavis, to Internal Revenue Serv.
(May 19, 1994), reprinted in Partnership Antiabuse Regs Should Be Rescinded, Banoff Asserts,
TAX NOTES TODAY, May 19, 1994, 94 TNT 106-24 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Banoff Comments:
Part 1]. In describing a discussion of the proposed regulation at the May 1994 ABA meeting,
Banoff notes that:
The IRS representative's statement ... that "we issued this regulation under Section
701 to make sure it was up front in Subchapter K, so everyone would see it" might
be true. It may be equally true that it was issued under Section 701 because there is
no authority in any section of Subchapter K for this regulation, and since it preempts
statutory compliance with the rest of Subchapter K, it needs to be placed first.
Id.; see also ABA Comments, supra note 74; James A. Gouwar, The Proposed Partnership
Anti-Abuse Regulation: Treasury Oversteps Its Authority, 11 J. PARTNERSHIP TAx'N 287, 291
(1995) (noting that "[elxactly how the [Proposed] Regulation relates to Section 701 is unclear");
Letter from Barbara C. Spudis & James H. Barrett, Baker & McKenzie, to Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, Internal Revenue Serv. (July 25, 1994), reprinted in Commentators Say Partnership
Antiabuse Rule Should Be Withdrawn, TAx NOTES TODAY, July 25, 1994, 94 TNT 152-37
(LEXIS) [hereinafter Baker & McKenzie Comments].
- I.R.C. § 701 (2006).
81 See, e.g., ABA Comments, supra note 74 ("The Proposed Regulation's operative
provisions, by design, produce a result contrary to the literal language of subchapter K or other
provisions of the Code."); Richard M. Upton, Controversial Partnership Anti-Abuse Prop.
Regs. Raise Many Questions, 81 J. TAX'N 68, 74 (1994) [hereinafter Lipton, Controversial
Prop. Regs.] ("Indeed, the Proposed Regulations expressly override the Code in transactions
deemed inconsistent with the intent of Subchapter K."); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Tax Section,
Comments to Proposed Regulations section 1.701-2, reprinted in Philadelphia Bar Tax Section
Calls for Partnership Rule's Withdrawal, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 30, 1994, 94 TNT 140-31
(LEXIS) [hereinafter Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Comments] ("The proposed rule constitutes a
significant change in existing law, which is not authorized by any existing statutory provision in
subchapter K . . . ."); Letter from Ernst & Young to Internal Revenue Serv. (July 1, 1994),
reprinted in Ernst & Young Criticizes Partnership Antiabuse Reg., TAX NOTES TODAY, June 27,
1994, 94 TNT 141-32 (LEXIS) ("The regulation is so broad as to defy meaningful
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regulation permitted the Service to disregard the form of a partnership
transaction, even if it fully complied with the literal language of
subchapter K.82 In doing so, the proposed PAAR inappropriately
trumped Congress's intent, as expressed in the carefully crafted,
highly technical provisions of subchapter K. And it did so without
any specific congressional authorization. 84
interpretation."); Letter from Michael Lux, Deloitte & Touche, to Internal Revenue Serv. (July
1, 1994), reprinted in Deloitte & Touche Says Reg Exceeds IRS's Authority, TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 1, 1994, 94 TNT 139-68 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Deloitte Comments] ("In essence, if
adopted, Treasury and IRS would be issuing a regulation for a statute that does not exist. We
believe that would exceed IRS' and Treasury's regulatory authority.").
82 See Lipton, Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 74; Baker & McKenzie
Comments, supra note 79; Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal Comments, supra note 74.
8 See, e.g., Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 81 ("We know of no
expression of Congressional will that suggests that a partnership transaction motivated by
legitimate business reasons may be denied the application of the provisions of subchapter K
with which it literally complies."); see also Chicago Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74;
Florida Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 72; Los Angeles Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74;
Gouwar, supra note 79, at 287-89.
8 Some practitioners went a step further, asserting that the proposed PAAR contravened
congressional intent, as reflected in past amendments to subchapter K's allocation provisions.
See ABA Comments, supra note 74 ("Congress has considered anti-avoidance language of the
type in the Proposed Regulation and has rejected it."); Chicago Bar Ass'n Comments, supra
note 74 ("Congress has previously considered and rejected broad anti-tax avoidance language
for the administration of subchapter K."). When Congress amended the partnership allocation
rules set forth in Section 704 in 1976, it considered a provision prohibiting a partnership from
making an allocation if such allocation lacked a business purpose or would result in a significant
avoidance or evasion of tax. See Tax Reform Bill of 1975, H.R. 101612, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975). The Senate rejected this provision because of concern over its "significant avoidance or
evasion of any tax" language. S. REP. No. 94-938, at 100 & 100 n.1 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3536. Specifically, the Senate was concerned that such language might
result in the disallowance of an allocation having both a business purpose and economic
substance. Id. at 100 n. 11. Rather than the "significant avoidance or evasion of tax" threshold,
Congress enacted the substantial economic effect rules, which remain the governing standard for
partnership allocations today. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 709(d), 90
Stat. 1520, 1548 (1976). Even though almost twenty years had passed, the proposed PAAR's
opponents believed that the history of the partnership allocation rules represented an express
congressional rejection of any rule including a tax avoidance component. As the Chicago Bar
Association noted:
Congress has already rejected the standard of 'significant avoidance or evasion of
any tax' to guide administration of provisions which are significant to the operation
of subchapter K. Treasury cannot now issue an interpretative regulation that attempts
to implement an even broader anti-abuse rule than [what] Congress has not adopted.
Chicago Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74; see also ABA Comments, supra note 74 ("In our
view, Congress ... expressly rejected the concept of 'significant tax avoidance or evasion of
any tax' as a standard to guide the administration of subchapter K."); Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants, Comments on Proposed Regulation Section 1.701-2 Regarding Anti-Abuse Rule
for Subchapter K, reprinted in AICPA Calls For Changes in Partnership Antiabuse Reg., TAX
NOTES TODAY, July 13, 1994, 94 TNT 139-64 (LEXIS) [hereinafter AICPA Comments] ("The
use of an 'intent to avoid tax' standard in so far as it applies to the application of Code section
704(b) is contrary to the express intent of Congress."); Gouwar, supra note 79, at 292.
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b. Uncertainty
Practitioners also believed that the proposed PAAR created an
impossible level of uncertainty within subchapter K. They claimed
that the proposed regulation was both vague and overbroad, and
created novel challenges in structuring partnership transactions.
Specifically, they charged that the uncertainty surrounding the
proposed PAAR's application would increase the cost and risk of
entering into partnership transactions. And this, practitioners posited,
would lead to the scenario they feared most-paralysis of the market
for partnership transactions.
This apocalyptic vision began with the proposed PAAR's
vagueness, which practitioners believed rendered the regulation
unworkable. To them, the Treasury failed to provide taxpayers with
sufficient guidance regarding the types of transactions it considered
abusive and, therefore, in violation of the proposed PAAR. Absent
such guidance, no one could predict what techniques might trouble
the Treasury. Further exacerbating the problem, the proposed PAAR
contained only four explanatory examples,86 and only one violated the
8 See, e.g., Tax Executives Inst., Inc., Comments of Tax Executives Institute, Inc., on
Proposed Regulations Under Section 701 of the Internal Revenue Code, reprinted in TEI Urges
Withdrawal of Partnership Antiabuse Rule, TAX NEWS TODAY, July 18, 1994, 1994 TNT
140-21 (LEXIS) ("Indeed, the Treasury and IRS appear to be attempting to limit debate on the
proper scope of tax planning-or precisely defining what is or is not an 'abuse'-by invoking
the shibboleth of 'anti-abuse' rules. By providing little or no useful information on the 'bad'
transactions to be avoided, however, the Treasury and IRS prevent taxpayers from knowing,
BEFORE THE FACT, what the proper tax planning standard is to be."); see also Upton,
Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 70 ("The most significant problem with the
Proposed Regulations is that they are so broadly and vaguely worded, and the examples are so
limited, that it is almost impossible to determine what transactions will be covered."); Baker &
McKenzie Comments, supra note 79 ("If the government cannot be more specific as to the
situations it is targeting, how can it expect practitioners to understand and interpret the
regulation?"); Banoff Comments: Part 1, supra note 79; Letter from Elizabeth A. Case, Price
Waterhouse, to Internal Revenue Serv. (June 30, 1994), reprinted in Price Waterhouse Says
Existing Law Is Sufficient to Curb Abusive Partnership Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY, June
30, 1994, 94 TNT 141-33 (LEXIS); Letter from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy,
Small Bus. Admin., to Margaret Richardson, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Aug. 26, 1994),
reprinted in SBA Criticizes Partnership Antiabuse Rule, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 26, 1994, 94
TNT 228-27 (LEXIS) ("[It is one thing to expect tax practitioners to judge the tax ramifications
of business transactions based on an [sic] reasonably ascertainable standard elucidated by the
Service. It is quite another to require these practitioners to render an opinion based on a standard
which the Service itself has not yet adequately articulated in its regulations."); Letter from
Michael S. Wolff, Nat'l Dir. of Tax Servs., Grant Thornton, to Internal Revenue Serv. (June 29,
1994), reprinted in Grant Thornton Calls Antiabuse Rule an Invitation to Unfairness, TAX
NOTES TODAY July 21, 1994, 94 TNT 141-34 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Grant Thornton Comments]
("[The proposed PAAR] does not provide adequate guidance as to the difference between
legitimate tax planning (which every taxpayer has a right to do) and the use of a partnership in a
transaction that exploits or misuses the provisions of subchapter K.").
8 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e), 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581, 25,583-84 (May 17, 1994).
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regulation.87  Practitioners considered this wholly inadequate,
concluding that the proposed PAAR was devoid of any useful
guidance about abusive transactions."
Particularly problematic to practitioners was the intent of
subchapter K standard. 8 9 They objected to the Treasury's decision to
reduce the intent of the entire partnership tax regime into a single
sentence.90 To these practitioners, the intent of subchapter K must
encompass the intent of each individual partnership provision, as well
as the overarching intent of all the provisions taken together. And
they believed it was impossible to do this in one sentence.91
Even if the Treasury could reduce the intent of subchapter K to
one sentence, significant questions remained. How should taxpayers
reconcile the proposed PAAR's intent of subchapter K standard with
the intent of individual partnership provisions? 92 Likewise, how
should they reconcile this standard with provisions outside subchapter
K and with the judicial doctrines? 93 Practitioners wanted guidance,
but the proposed PAAR left these questions unanswered.
87 See, e.g., ABA Comments, supra note 74 (recommending a new version of the
Proposed Regulation that would "provide numerous examples"); Baker & McKenzie
Comments, supra note 79; Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal Comments, supra note 74
("Additional examples should be provided which illustrate the limited types of transactions
which can be recharacterized."); see also NYSBA Report, supra note 33; Gouwar, supra note
79, at 288; Lipton, Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 70.
88 See, e.g., Baker & McKenzie Comments, supra note 79 ("[I]t appears that both
government representatives and members of the partnership tax bar are having marked difficulty
in producing examples of the abuse targeted."); Banoff Comments: Part 1, supra note 79 ("Are
there not specific examples of transactions of which the IRS has knowledge that could be
illustrated? Are there really no abuses currently in mind, after all?').
89 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a), 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,583.
9o See Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal Comments, supra note 74 ('The Proposed
Regulation attempts to distill numerous provisions of the Code and regulations into a single
sentence; this general statement does not provide meaningful guidance and leads to significant
confusion and uncertainty."); see also Chicago Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74.
91 See Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal Comments, supra note 74. The comments
asserted:
The 'intent' of subchapter K is reflected in numerous provisions which address the
specific way in which a partnership interrelates with its partners. All of these
provisions, taken individually and together, set forth the intent of subchapter K; the
intent of an entire subchapter of the Code is not accurately reflected in one sentence.
Id.
92 See NYSBA Report, supra note 33 (recommending that "the final regulation should
contain an express statement that it will not apply where the intended tax results are specifically
contemplated by the Code and/or regulations. Taxpayers should not have to defend such results
on the ground that they are consistent with the overall intent of Subchapter K."); Sonnenschein
Nath & Rosenthal Comments, supra note 74 (noting the difficultly of reconciling the individual
intent of various provisions of subchapter K and the overall intent of subchapter K standard set
forth in the proposed PAAR).
9 See, e.g., Lipton, Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 70; Orange County Bar
Ass'n Comments, supra note 71; Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal Comments, supra note 74.
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The proposed regulation's vagueness raised the additional concern
of overbreadth. Despite the Treasury's repeated statements that the
proposed PAAR was only intended to apply to a small number of
abusive large partnership transactions,94  the regulation's broad
language indicated otherwise. Indeed, practitioners believed the
proposed PAAR's language was so expansive that it could apply to
virtually any partnership transaction.96 Because a taxpayer's decision
to use the partnership form almost invariably involved a desire to reap
the benefits of pass-through taxation, one of the proposed PAAR's
two standards-a principal purpose of tax reduction-would exist in
most partnership transactions.97 If a transaction were also inconsistent
with the intent of subchapter K, it would violate the proposed PAAR.
Thus, virtually every partnership transaction would require careful
analysis to determine whether it complied with the intent of
subchapter K.
Herein lay the problem. Practitioners maintained that the proposed
PAAR's uncertainty made it impossible to predict what transactions
the Service might consider contrary to the intent of subchapter K.99
9 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg. at 25,582; see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
9 See Banoff Comments: Part 1, supra note 79 (noting that, despite repeated statements
from persons at the Treasury and the Service to the contrary, the proposed PAAR could
potentially apply to any "partnership transactions which generate tax savings").
9 See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 81. The Philadelphia Bar
Association commented that:
We understand that individual members of the Department of Treasury have publicly
stated that certain legitimate business transactions would not be affected by this
regulation.. . . It strains credulity to believe that a regulation that plainly can be read
to apply to legitimate transactions somehow does not apply merely because certain
Treasury officials say it was not intended to apply to those types of transactions.
Id.; see also Chicago Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74; Florida Bar Ass'n Comments, supra
note 70; Baker & McKenzie Comments, supra note 79; Letter from Coopers & Lybrand to
Margaret Millner Richardson, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv. (July 5, 1994), reprinted in
Coopers & Lybrand Urges Withdrawal Partnership Antiabuse Rule, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 7,
1994, 94 TNT 172-25 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand Comments]; Upton,
Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 70; Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal Comments,
supra note 74.
9 See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 81 ("[T]he Tax Reduction Test of
the anti-abuse rule will catch virtually every business transaction where taxation is a
consideration; rational business people will ALWAYS arrange their legitimate affairs so as to
minimize taxation.").
9 See Coopers & Lybrand Comments, supra note 96 (identifying twenty-six common
transactions that could be subject to the proposed regulation); Upton, Controversial Prop.
Regs., supra note 81, at 71-72 (identifying five common transactions that could be subject to
the proposed regulation); Los Angeles Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74 (identifying eleven
common transactions that could be subject to the proposed regulations).
9 See, e.g., Lipton, Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 70 ("The most significant
problem with the Proposed Regulations is that they are so broadly and vaguely worded, and the
examples are so limited, that it is almost impossible to determine what transactions will be
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Because of the regulation's vagueness and overbreadth, a practitioner
could reasonably conclude that any transaction violated the proposed
PAAR.1" Indeed, practitioners believed that it would be impossible to
advise a client that the Service would not challenge her transaction
under the proposed PAAR.on Likewise, it would be impossible to
advise a client on how the Service would recharacterize a transaction
that violated the proposed PAAR.102 Thus, tax planning would
become more conservative, more qualified, and more expensive.10 3
And this, perhaps more than anything, concerned practitioners.
They feared that the proposed PAAR's uncertainty would make the
use of subchapter K both cost and risk prohibitive, thereby impairing
the market for partnership transactions. 1" To this end, these
practitioners made a very simple argument against the proposed
covered.").
10 See Lawrence M. Stone, Proposed Antiabuse Reg Will Create Uncertainty but
Accomplish Little Else, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 4, 1994, 94 TNT 131-45 (LEXIS) ("Because
they provide no guidance, the proposed regulations may unfortunately accomplish little good.
That in itself would not be troublesome if they did not have the mischievous characteristic of
creating great uncertainty for what I believe are permitted uses."); Grant Thornton Comments,
supra note 85 ("Prudent businessmen and their tax advisors will now have to consider the
impact of the Proposed Regulation in all but the simplest situations. The uncertainty and
complexity in applying the intent standard will be yet another seemingly incomprehensible tax
risk for the common businessman to consider and will have a dampening affect on legitimate
business transactions. It is exactly this type of uncertainty and complexity that undermines the
middle market businessman's confidence in the U.S. tax system."); see also Sonnenschein Nath
& Rosenthal Comments, supra note 74.
1' See Lipton, Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 72.
10 See id.
1 3 Indeed, many commentators believed that legitimate partnership transactions would
suffer more than abusive transactions under the proposed PAAR. These commentators posited
that most abusive transactions already receive a heightened degree of analysis under existing
judicial doctrines. Thus, the PAAR's introduction would likely have little effect on the legal
advice given in connection with abusive partnership transactions. See, e.g., id. at 73 ("While it is
doubtless true that some transactions would be outside of the Service's authority under existing
case law (and would require a statutory change), these solutions are relatively limited. Thus, the
IRS might have limited the controversy surrounding the Proposed Regulations by not attempting
to 'boldly regulate' where no one had gone before."); Grant Thornton Comments, supra note 85
("The aggressive tax advisors and taxpayers involved in large abusive partnerships already deal
with risk of this type and will not be deterred by the Proposed Regulation. It is the cautious and
conservative businessman who will struggle with these rules and, in some cases, in an effort to
reduce risk choose less desirable operating structures or abandon legitimate business
opportunities altogether.").
0 See, e.g., Los Angeles Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74 ("[Tlhe proposed regulation
can be expected to inhibit legitimate business transactions involving partnerships."); Lipton,
Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 73 (discussing the "chilling effect" the Proposed
Regulations could have on non-abusive partnership transactions); Baker & McKenzie
Comments, supra note 79 ("The approach chosen has the unfortunate effect of not being
specific enough to assist in interpreting those transaction and yet being so broad as to have a
chilling effect on bona fide transactions."); Coopers & Lybrand Comments, supra note 96
(discussing the potential chilling effect of the Proposed Regulation on the development of new
partnership transactions).
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PAAR: the proposed PAAR increased the uncertainty of partnership
transactions. Because the market does not like uncertainty, they
claimed, the proposed PAAR was bad and, therefore, should be
withdrawn immediately. 05
c. Unpredictable IRS Application
Practitioners also claimed that the proposed PAAR presented
insurmountable enforcement challenges for the Service. Specifically,
these practitioners feared that the Service would be incapable of
applying the proposed PAAR in a consistent and objective manner.'
One practitioner described the "rogue" agent problem in the following
colorful manner:
The regulation casts a dark and ominous cloud over
partnership entities throughout the land in spite of its limited
objective .... Once cast, no one would be able to effectively
control its reach. No one today can reasonably predict how
such a vague regulation could be interpreted by future
officials at the IRS and Treasury. 0 7
'
5 Lee Sheppard may have described this argument best when she reported that "Wall
Street lawyers who represent investment bankers are arguing to Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., that the future of capitalism depends on
investment bankers' ability to sell tax shelters to corporate chief financial officers." Sheppard,
Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 22, at 942. Ms. Sheppard proceeded with commentary that is
particularly apt today:
Now, investment bankers perform a socially and economically valuable function in
moving capital from investors to businesses; this is called underwriting, and
investment bankers make a lot of money from it. Merchant bankers, of which there
are few in America, even invest in businesses. The economy has an interest in seeing
these functions efficiently carried out. Investment bankers also make huge profits
from other activities for which there does not appear to be a compelling social or
economic need, like trading for their own accounts, playing games with government
securities, and designing exotic products to be sold to unwitting retail investors and
young mutual fund managers. No one would seriously argue that a Merrill Lynch or
a Kidder Peabody should be rescued by the government for, say, losses incurred in
proprietary trading."
Id. (emphasis added). What a difference sixteen years has made!
1o*See, e.g., Florida Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74; Upton, Controversial Prop.
Regs., supra note 81, at 72; Banoff Comments: Part 1, supra note 79 ("If several hundred of the
top tax attorneys and accountants in America attending the ABA (and other) meetings in the
past week cannot figure out where the line is drawn or why, the test cannot possibly be applied
uniformly and administratively by IRS field agents. . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
'"Deloitte Comments, supra note 81. Lee Sheppard offered this description of the
problem:
Much complaining about the partnership antiabuse rule has been that while the
lawyers in Washington know what they are doing, 'rogue' IRS agents will come
roaring up to a taxpayer's premises in an old Ford Torino with fake mag
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Practitioners posited that examiners could misapply the proposed
PAAR in two equally problematic manners-excessive application
and strategic application. First, because of the regulation's
uncertainty, an examiner could raise it in all instances out of an
abundance of caution.108 Likewise, an overzealous examiner might
indiscriminately find abuse in all instances where the partners'
aggregate federal income tax liability was reduced.'0 Second, a
strategic examiner could apply the proposed PAAR in order to exert
settlement pressure on a taxpayer.110 In either scenario, the Service's
application of the proposed PAAR would be inconsistent and
unpredictable, thereby exacerbating its debilitating uncertainty.
C. The Final Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule
Despite this remarkable turmoil, the Treasury remained intent on
finalizing the PAAR, 111 and it issued final regulations on December
wheelcovers, jump out with guns drawn, yell 'freeze!' and assert the partnership
anti-abuse rule.
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Final Partnership Antiabuse Rule-Grudging Acceptance,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 10, 1995, 95 TNT 28-5 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Sheppard, Grudging
Acceptance].
' See Sheldon I. Banoff, Proposed Antiabuse Reg is 'Fatally Flawed,' TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 4, 1994, 94 TNT 131-44 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Banoff Comments: Part 2]; see also
Florida Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 74 (arguing that the broad language of the proposed
PAAR will likely discourage legitimate partnership transactions).
"0See Banoff Comments: Part 2, supra note 108. With his usual flair, Mr. Banoff
described the excessive application problem in this way:
[Wihoever is interpreting the proposed reg[ulation] (as written in its current form)
will effectively be the all-powerful, omnipotent "Subchapter K King," because the
proposed reg[ulation] is so broad and vague that large numbers of transactions will
fall into the gray area of its scope and thus be subject to unpredictability and
administrative discretion. The Subchapter K King will be able to exercise his (or her)
"divine authority" to exercise discretion in whatever manner is then felt appropriate.
... Will the Subchapter K King instruct his tax collectors (IRS field agents) to bring
forward all types of partnership transactions involving aggressive (in the eyes of the
IRS) tax planning for determination as to potential abusive status? Will the tax
collectors view any transaction that generates tax savings as being "abusive," i.e.,
having a principal purpose of reducing taxes "in a manner that is inconsistent with
the intent of Subchapter K"?
Id.; see also AICPA Comments, supra note 84 ("One of the significant concerns of both
taxpayers and their advisors is that this proposed regulation will be used by field agents to
arbitrarily recast a transaction simply because it provides a result favorable to the taxpayer, even
when there are valid business reasons for the particular form .... ).
1
o See Lipton, Controversial Prop. Regs., supra note 81, at 72 ("[T]he vague standard set
forth in these provisions could be used by an IRS agent to gain leverage in the course of an
audit."); Coopers & Lybrand Comments, supra note 96 ("[A]gents may be tempted to use the
regulation to bring settlement pressures to bear on otherwise legitimate transactions.").
I See Juliann Avakian Martin, Officials Address Partnership Antiabuse, Passive Activity
Loss Reg Projects, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 1, 1994, 94 TNT 214-1 (LEXIS); Lee A.
426 CASE WESTERN RESERVE IAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2
29, 1994.112 In doing so, the Treasury preserved the PAAR's core
provisionl 3-a two-pronged anti-abuse rule prohibiting the formation
or use of a partnership "in connection with a transaction a principal
purpose of which is to reduce substantially the present value of the
partners' aggregate federal tax liability in a manner that is
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K."l 1 4 Like the proposed
PAAR, the final PAAR also provides that the intent of subchapter K
is to "permit taxpayers to conduct joint business (including
investment) activities through a flexible economic arrangement
without incurring an entity-level tax.,,
15
Nonetheless, the Treasury did revise the PAAR, presumably to
mollify the regulation's critics. Most importantly, the Treasury
clarified the final PAAR's scope. To this end, the Treasury more fully
articulated the intent of subchapter K standard by providing three
requirements that are implicit in such intent. First, a partnership must
be bona fide, and any transaction or series of transactions entered into
by the partnership must have a substantial business purpose.116
Second, the form of any partnership transaction must be respected
under substance over form principles.1 17 Third, the tax consequences
of any transaction must accurately reflect the partners' economic
agreement and properly reflect each partner's income.118
Sheppard, Partnership Antiabuse Rule is Here to Stay, Officials Say, TAX NOTES TODAY, July
12, 1994, 94 TNT 134-1 (LEXIS).
112 T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109. Within weeks of the final PAAR's issuance, the Treasury
provided notice that the regulation would be amended. See I.R.S. Announcement 95-8, 1995-7
I.R.B. 56. Specifically, the Treasury intended to amend the regulation to provide that it would
apply only with respect to federal income taxes. Id. at 56-57. As a result, Treasury intended to
delete two of the final PAAR's examples-Examples 5 and 6. Id. at 57. These changes were
ultimately published in the Federal Register on April 13, 1995. See Subchapter K Anti-Abuse
Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,741 (Apr. 13, 1995); T.D. 8592, 1995-1 C.B. 119. For purposes of this
Article, all discussion of the PAAR, as finalized, takes the 1995 amendments into account.
113 
n addition, the final PAAR includes a separate provision addressing abuses related to
the entity treatment of partnerships. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e) (as amended in 1995).
Specifically, the abuse of entity rule permits the Service to treat a partnership as an aggregate of
its partners, rather than a separate entity, if necessary to fulfill the purpose of any provision of
the Code. Id. § 1.701-2(e)(1). The rule will not apply, however, if the applicable Code provision
explicitly provides for the partnership to be treated as an entity, and the ultimate tax
consequences of entity treatment are clearly contemplated by such provision. Id. §
1.701-2(e)(2). This Article focuses on the PAAR's abuse of subchapter K rule rather than its
abuse of entity rule. For a more detailed discussion of the PAAR's abuse of entity role, see
McKEE ET AL., TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, at 1.05[6] and
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 38.
"
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b).
"5Id. § 1.701-2(a).
1161d. § 1.701-2(a)(1).
"Id. § 1.701-2(a)(2).
118 Id. § 1.701-2(a)(3).
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Unlike the first two requirements, the proper reflection of income
requirement presents difficulties. In drafting some of subchapter K's
provisions, Congress found it impossible to reconcile its goal that a
transaction's tax consequences properly reflect income with
competing goals, such as administrability and simplicity.119 Thus, by
design, certain provisions of subchapter K produce tax consequences
that do not properly reflect income.1 0 Cognizant of this congressional
tradeoff, the Treasury provided that a transaction will satisfy the
proper reflection of income requirement to the extent that the
application of a particular provision of subchapter K and the resulting
tax consequences are each clearly contemplated by such provision.' 2'
The Treasury also provided additional guidance for determining
whether a partnership has a principal purpose of substantially
reducing the federal income tax liability of its partners in a manner
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K. Like the proposed
regulation, the final PAAR notes that the Service shall determine
whether a transaction violates the regulation by considering all
relevant facts and circumstances. 122 This time, however, the Treasury
enumerated seven non-exclusive factors to be considered in making
this determination.12 3 For instance, the Service may consider whether
the present value of the partners' aggregate federal income tax
liability is substantially less than if the partners had owned the
partnership's assets directly or if purportedly separate transactions are
treated as one integrated transaction.124 Further, the Service may
consider whether a partner has a temporary or nominal interest in the
partnership.125 In addition, and of particular importance, the final
"
9 See id.
20MId. The final PAAR lists the following examples of partnership provisions that may
result in tax consequences that do not clearly reflect income: Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c)
(value equals basis assumption in partnership allocations); I.R.C. § 754 (election to adjust basis
in partnership property following certain distributions and sales of partnership interests); Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(1) (de minimis rule regarding partnership allocations attributable to
contributed property); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(4) (de minimis rule regarding the allocation of
recourse liabilities).
121 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3). In addition, this special rule for transactions generating tax
consequences that do not clearly reflect income will only apply if the final PAAR's first two
requirements are satisfied. Id.
122d. § 1.701-2(c).
123 Id.
12 4 Id. § 1.701-2(c)(1)-(2).
I Id. § 1.701-2(c)(3). Additional factors that the Service may consider include:
(1) whether substantially all of the partners are related to one another; (2) whether the benefits
and burdens of ownership of property nominally contributed to the partnership are retained by
the contributing partner; and (3) whether the benefits and burdens of ownership of partnership
property are substantially shifted to a distributee partner before or after the property is actually
distributed to such partner. Id. § 1.701-2(c)(4), (6)-(7). In addition, if a partnership allocates
items in a manner consistent with section 704's literal language but the results are inconsistent
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PAAR includes a "super-factor," permitting the Service to compare
the stated business purpose for a transaction with the tax benefits
arising from such transaction.126 In evaluating these transactions,
however, the weight afforded to any particular factor depends entirely
on the facts and circumstances of the transaction. 127
To better illustrate the final PAAR's application, the Treasury
expanded the examples of acceptable and unacceptable
128transactions.18 The final PAAR includes eleven examples, as
compared to the proposed regulation's four, and a more thorough
analysis of each specified transaction.12 9 Although most examples
involve transactions complying with the regulation, the final PAAR
includes three examples of transactions violating the regulation.130
Like the examples set forth in the proposed PAAR, however, the
Treasury explicitly limits the examples' applicability to the facts and
circumstances set forth in each specific example. 131
In conjunction with the final PAAR's issuance, the Service
instituted a special enforcement procedure designed to promote the
uniform and objective application of the regulation. 132 Specifically,
the Service now requires its examiners to obtain prior approval from
the IRS National Office before challenging a transaction based on the
final PAAR.133 Thus, the IRS National Office maintains primary
with its purpose, then the Service may consider such factor in determining whether the final
PAAR is violated, particularly when the partnership specially allocates income or gain to a
partner that is actually or effectively exempt from tax. Id. § 1.701-2(c)(5).
12 6 1d. § 1.701-2(c).
127 Id
12 8 Id. § 1.701-2(d).
12 9 Id. Initially, the final PAAR contained thirteen examples, but the Treasury amended the
regulation and deleted two of its examples. Compare T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109, 114 (initial
rule with 13 examples), with T.D. 8592, 1995-1 C.B. 119, 120 (final rule eliminating examples
5 and 6).
130 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), exs. 7, 9, 11.
'' See id. § 1.701-2(d) ("[Tlhe addition of any facts or circumstances that are not
specifically set forth in an example (or the deletion of any facts or circumstances) may alter the
outcome of the transaction described in the example."). For a more thorough discussion of the
final PAAR's examples, see MCKEE ET AL., supra note 78, at 1.05[3]. See also Herman J.
Marino, The Final Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation: The Treasury Redefines the "Intent of
Subchapter K," 73 TAXES 171, 176 (1995).
132 See I.R.S. Announcement 94-87, 1994-27 I.R.B. 124 (June 13, 1994).
133 See id.; see also I.R.S. Coordinated Issue Paper, Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule
Regulation Section 1.701-2 (June 26, 1995), TAX NOTES TODAY, June 26, 1995, 95 TNT 124-10
(LEXIS) (directing examiners to contact the partnership industry or issue specialist when
considering an issue under section 1.701-2); Memorandum from L.E. Carlow, Assistant
Comm'r of Examinations, Internal Revenue Serv., to Regional Chief Compliance Officers (Oct.
17, 1995), reprinted in Examiners Directed Not to Raise Antiabuse Issue Without Permission,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 17, 1995, 95 TNT 207-10 (LEXIS) (requiring examiners to contact the
Partnership Issue Specialist or Partnership Industry Specialist to obtain clearance before raising
the final PAAR with a taxpayer).
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responsibility for coordinating the final PAAR's application
throughout the country. 134
D. The Post-Issuance World: 1995 to Present
Sixteen years have passed since the Treasury issued the final
PAAR. Thus, sufficient time has elapsed to assess the PAAR's impact
on the federal income tax system. Were practitioners' virtually
unanimous doomsday predictions accurate? Did the regulation bring
about the demise of commercial partnership transactions? Did the
Service indiscriminately apply the final PAAR to any and every
transaction that it did not like or understand?
The answer to all these questions is no. For a regulation earnestly
compared to a weapon of mass destruction,13 5 the final PAAR has had
a surprisingly modest impact on subchapter K. The Service has relied
on the final PAAR in few published materials, and no court has
decided a case based on the regulation.'36 Even practitioners, who
responded furiously to the proposed PAAR, have adopted a muted
approach to the regulation.137 This Section tracks the PAAR's
application from its finalization to the present, illustrating its nominal
presence in the world of partnership taxation.
1. Administrative Guidance
Almost five years passed before the publication of any
administrative material-whether intended as public guidance to
taxpayers or internal guidance to examiners-in which the Service
challenged a transaction based on the final PAAR.138 Similar to the
134 The Service has, however, given examiners blanket approval to raise the final PAAR
without the prior consent of the IRS National Office in seven designated areas: (1) transactions
involving a sale of state tax credits; (2) Son-of-BOSS transactions; (3) partnership straddle
transactions; (4) S corporation transactions involving excess losses; (5) transactions involving
the sale of compensatory options to related parties; (6) transactions involving foreign
corporations and the creation of deductions; and (7) Redemption BOB transactions. Shop Talk,
Agents Will Apply, Courts May Deny, supra note 27, at 314; see also Sheryl Stratton, IRS Gives
Agents Blanket Authority to Apply Partnership Antiabuse Reg, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 15,
2007, 2007 TNT 51-5 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Stratton, Blanket Authority].
135 See Orange County Bar Ass'n Comments, supra note 71 (equating section 1.701-2 to
using an atomic bomb to perform delicate brain surgery).
16See infra Part I.D.1.
137 See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, The Partnership Anti-Abuse Regs. Revisited: Is There
Calm After the Storm?, 83 J. TAX'N 68, 68 (1995) [hereinafter Lipton, Calm After the Storm?]
("While the validity of the Regulations continues to be questionable, practitioners should take a
practical approach in planning transactions."); Lee A. Sheppard, Final Partnership Antiabuse
Rule: Not So Bad, Apparently, 66 TAX NOTEs 465, 465 (1995) [hereinafter Sheppard, Not So
Bad, Apparently].
138 Although the Service did not apply the final PAAR in any published guidance for
approximately five years, it did mention the regulation in various authorities, generally noting
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tax climate at the time of the PAAR's proposal, partnership tax
shelters were proliferating, and the Service was struggling to devise
an effective strategy to combat them.13 9 Thus, the Service turned to
the final PAAR. In most instances, the Service raised the regulation
together with a judicial doctrine like the economic substance
doctrine. 140 To date, the Service has relied on the final PAAR as the
that it did not apply. See Field. Serv. Adv. 1999-230 (March 26, 1999), TAX NOTES TODAY,
March 26, 1999, 99 TNT 165-71 (LEXIS); Field Serv. Adv. 1999-36-011, 1999 FSA LEXIS
166 (June 3, 1999) (PAAR not applicable to determination of whether payment by an LLC to a
member is treated as a section 707 sale or exchange); Field Serv. Adv. 1999 FSA LEXIS 386
(Mar. 26, 1999) (PAAR not applicable to determination of whether taxpayer is a partner); Field
Serv. Adv. 1998 FSA LEXIS 315 (Sept. 23, 1998) (transaction completed prior to effective date
of PAAR); Field Serv. Adv. 1998 FSA LEXIS 356 (June 5, 1998) (transaction completed prior
to effective date of PAAR); Field Serv. Adv. 1998 FSA LEXIS 337 (Apr. 15, 1998) (transaction
completed prior to effective date of PAAR); Field Serv. Adv. 1997 FSA LEXIS 208 (Aug. 14,
1997) (transaction completed prior to effective date of PAAR); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-45-015
(Aug. 9, 1996) (expressing no opinion on whether the PAAR applies to the transaction); Field
Serv. Adv. 1996 FSA LEXIS 177 (June 6, 1996) (transaction completed prior to effective date
of PAAR); Field Serv. Adv. 1995 FSA LEXIS 192, (Nov. 20, 1995) (transaction completed
prior to effective date of PAAR).
There is, however, one 1998 Field Service Advice Memorandum that notes the existence
of the final PAAR and advises the examiner to contact either the Partnership Industry Specialist
or the IRS National Office to seek authorization to apply the regulation. Field Serv. Adv. 1998
FSA LEXIS 276 (Apr. 13, 1998). But again, the Service did not apply the final PAAR in this
memorandum. Id.
'
39 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); United Parcel
Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States
253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298
(D.D.C. 2001), rev'd, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Salina P'ship L.P. v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M.
(CCH) 686 (2000); Saba P'ship v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 684 (1999), vacated, 273 F.3d
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
'# See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2008-07-015 (Nov. 7, 2007) (foreign tax credit
generator transaction); I.R.S. Coordinated Issue Paper, Distressed Asset/Debt Tax Shelters (Apr.
18, 2007), TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 18, 2007, 2007 TNT 79-11 (LEXIS) (distressed asset/debt
transaction); Chief Couns. Adv. 2007-002 (Jan. 11, 2007), TAx NOTES TODAY, Jan. 11, 2007,
2007 TNT 19-23 (LEXIS) (state income tax credit generator transaction); Chief Couns. Adv.
2007-04-030 (Oct. 6, 2006), TAx NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, 2006, 2007 TNT 19-21 (LEXIS) (state
income tax credit generator transaction); Chief Couns. Adv. 2007-002 (Jan. 11, 2007), TAX
NOTES TODAY, Jan. 11, 2007, 2007 TNT 19-23 (LEXIS) (state income tax credit generator
transaction); Chief Couns. Adv. 2007-04-028, (Oct. 6, 2006), TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, 2006,
2007 TNT 19-20 (LEXIS) (state income tax credit generator transaction); I.R.S. Coordinated
Issue Paper, Redemption Bogus Optional Basis Tax Shelter (Jan. 31, 2006), TAX NOTES TODAY,
Jan. 31, 2006, 2006 TNT 25-38 (LEXIS) (Redemption BOB transaction); Chief Couns. Adv.
2004-50-001 (Apr. 4, 2003), TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 4, 2003, 2004 TNT 239-75 (LEXIS)
(transaction artificially increasing the basis of partnership assets under sections 732(c) and
708(b)(1)(B)); I.R.S. Coordinated Issue Paper, Transfer or Sale of Compensatory Options or
Restricted Stock to Related Persons (Oct. 15, 2004), TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 15, 2004, 2004
TNT 204-14 (LEXIS) (transfer or sale of stock to related persons); I.R.S. Notice 2004-31,
2004-1 C.B. 830 (earnings stripping transaction); LR.S. Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606
(foreign tax credit generator transaction); Chief Couns. Notice CC-2003-030 (Sept. 10, 2003),
TAX NOTES Today, Sept. 10, 2003, 2003 TNT 217-21 (LEXIS) (Son-of-BOSS transaction);
I.R.S. Notice 2003-55, 2003-2 C.B. 395 (lease stripping transaction); Chief Couns. Notice
CC-2003-020 (June 25, 2003), TAX NOTES TODAY, June 25, 2003, 2003 TNT 124-18 (LEXIS)
(Son-of-BOSS transaction); Field Serv. Adv. 2002-46-016 (Aug. 14, 2002), TAX NOTES
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sole grounds for challenging a transaction in only four written
determinations.14 1
Although the level of analysis varies, these administrative
materials generally contain little guidance about the final PAAR's
application. In many cases, the Service simply notes that it may
challenge the transaction under the final PAAR. 142 More recent
administrative materials contain more robust discussions of the
factors relevant to determining whether the transaction violates the
regulation. 14 3 Yet practitioners continue to criticize the Service for
TODAY, Aug. 14, 2002, 2002 TNT 222-46 (LEXIS) (leveraged partnership transaction); Chief
Couns. Adv. 2002-46-014 (Aug. 8, 2002), TAx NOTES TODAY, Aug. 8, 2002, 2002 TNT 222-46
(LEXIS) (leveraged partnership transaction); I.R.S. Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690
(pass-through entity straddle tax shelter); I.R.S. Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98 (partnership
straddle tax shelter); I.R.S. Coordinated Issue Paper, Losses Reported from Inflated Basis Assets
from Lease Stripping Transactions (Dec. 3, 2001), TAx NOTES TODAY, Dec. 3, 2001, 2001 TNT
235-18 (LEXIS) (lease stripping transaction); Field Serv. Adv. 2001-34-002 (Mar. 23, 2001),
TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 23, 2001, 2001 TNT 166-17 (LEXIS) (lease stripping transaction);
Chief Couns. Adv. 2001-18-005, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 8, 2001, 2001 TNT 88-71 (LEXIS)
(Son-of-BOSS transaction); I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (Son-of-BOSS
transaction).
Additionally, in several instances, the Service raised the PAAR as an alternative
second-level means of challenging a transaction. See, e.g., Chief Couns. Adv. 2006-50-014
(Sept. 7, 2006), TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 7, 2006, 2006 TNT 242-17 (LEXIS); Field Serv.
Adv. 2002-19-008 (Jan. 30, 2002), TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 30, 2002, 2002 TNT 92-55
(LEXIS); Field Serv. Adv. 2000-15-005 (Dec. 30, 1999), TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 30, 1999,
2000 TNT 74-57 (LEXIS).
141 See Chief Couns. Adv. 2006-13-031 (Nov. 1, 2005), TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 1, 2005,
2006 TNT 64-8 (LEXIS) (relying solely on the PAAR to invalidate a series of transactions);
Chief Couns. Adv. 2005-13-022 (Nov. 15, 2004), TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 15, 2004, 2005
TNT 63-36 (LEXIS) (using the PAAR to invalidate a building transfer); Field Serv. Adv.
2002-42-004 (July 19, 2002), TAX NOTES TODAY, July 19, 2002, 2002 TNT 204-45 (LEXIS)
(using the PAAR to prevent loss recognition on the sale of a loss property to a third party);
Chief Couns. Adv. 2001-28-053 (May 22, 2001), TAX NOTES TODAY, May 22, 2001, 2001 TNT
136-75 (LEXIS) (invoking the PAAR to recast a transaction abusing Section 732).
142 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2003-55, 2003-2 C.B. 395; I.R.S. Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B.
98; Chief Couns. Adv. 2001-28-053 (May 22, 2001), TAX NOTES TODAY, May 22, 2001, 2001
TNT 136-75 (LEXIS); Chief Couns. Adv. 2001-18-005 (Jan. 8, 2001), TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan.
8, 2001, 2001 TNT 88-71 (LEXIS); I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255; see also Shop
Talk, Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules: Postpone the Funeral, 95 J. TAX'N 123, 123 (2001)
("Application of the Regulation to date has been virtually nonexistent, and in the few reported
situations where it has been raised by a field agent, the National Office has ruled it not to be
applicable to the transaction at hand . . . or to be an alternative or additional argument in
connection with the Service's multiple attacks on an allegedly abusive tax shelter.").
14 3 See LR.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2008-07-015 (Nov. 7, 2007); Chief Couns. Adv.
2007-04-030 (Oct. 6, 2006), TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, 2007, 2007 TNT 19-21 (LEXIS); Chief
Couns. Adv. 2007-04-028 (Oct. 6, 2006), TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, 2007, 2007 TNT 19-20
(LEXIS); Chief Couns. Adv. 2006-13-031, 2005 IRS CCA LEXIS 99 (Nov. 1, 2005); Field
Serv. Adv. 2002-42-004, 2002 FSA LEXIS 75 (July 19, 2002); Field Serv. Adv. 2001-34-002
(Mar. 23, 2001), TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 23, 2001, 2001 TNT 166-17 (LEXIS). Although the
level of analysis contained in these authorities is greater than prior authorities, I do not suggest
that all practitioners considered this level of analysis adequate. See infra note 144 for an
example of a practitioner response to the heightened analysis set forth in these authorities.
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failing to provide them with the guidance necessary to apply the final
PAAR.144
There is also a growing perception among practitioners that the
Service's application of the final PAAR has become increasingly
aggressive. 14 5 But, like much of the lore surrounding the PAAR, the
known facts belie this concern. Although the Service does appear to
be relying on the final PAAR somewhat more often, the regulation
remains a rarely used tool in the fight against abusive partnership
transactions. In the past sixteen years, the Service has applied the
final PAAR in less than thirty published rulings and written
determinations.14 Of these, only six qualify as guidance that a
taxpayer may rely on when structuring a transaction.147
One might argue that these statistics are incomplete. Although
providing some evidence of the Service's limited reliance on the final
PAAR, such numbers fail to consider the Service's application of the
final PAAR in audits and withdrawn private letter ruling requests.148
'" See, e.g., Shop Talk, Misuse of Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, supra note 27, at 378. The
article maintains that
[i]t is possible that, with fuller explanation and analysis, the IRS could have
reasonably concluded that the transaction described in ILM 200613031 was
inconsistent with the intent of Subchapter K ... . The paucity of analysis, however,
makes it impossible to reach this conclusion .... Your editors find this 'analysis,'
such as it is, indefensible. If the IRS wants to assert that the partnership anti-abuse
Regulation applies to a given transaction, the IRS needs to better define the reason
for its application.
Id.
14 5 See id. at 377 ("[W]ith the passage of time, the IRS has become much more 'liberal' in
determining the situations in which it will attempt to apply the partnership anti-abuse
Regulation."). The Service has relaxed its enforcement restrictions with respect to the final
PAAR in one important respect. As of 2007, the Service has granted examiners blanket approval
to apply the regulation without prior approval from the IRS National Office in seven contexts,
many of which relate to listed transactions. See supra note 134. All other transactions remain
subject to the procedures set forth in Announcement 94-87. See supra notes 132-33 and
accompanying text. That is, an examiner cannot apply the final PAAR to a transaction without
the prior approval of the Partnership Industry Specialist or the IRS National Office.
146See supra notes 140-41.
14 7 See I.R.S. Notice 2004-31, 2004-1 C.B. 830; I.R.S. Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606;
I.R.S. Notice 2003-55, 2003-2 C.B. 395; I.R.S. Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690; I.R.S. Notice
2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98; I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255. The remaining authorities,
discussed supra notes 140-41 are primarily internal agency advice that taxpayers cannot rely on
as precedent.
us See Shop Talk, Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules: The Service's Clandestine Activities, 95
J. TAX'N 318, 318 (2001) ("Word now comes that [the] IRS is applying Reg. 1.701-2 in a
seemingly clandestine fashion . . . . Shop Talk subsequently spoke with Paul Kugler, IRS
Associate Chief Counsel, Pass-Throughs and Special Industries, who informed us that the IRS
indeed has applied Reg. 1.701-2 on numerous occasions. Although it occasionally arises in the
context of a letter ruling request, it more frequently arises in the context of audits .... ); see
also Brant Goldwyn, IRS Chief Counsel Office Grappling with Partnership Guidance Projects,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-6 (Oct. 19, 2001) ("IRS application of the [final PAAR] often is
not visible to the public because it involves letter ruling requests that are withdrawn before [the]
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Again, however, the available data do not support this concern.
Between 2003 and 2007, examiners submitted a mere 154 requests to
the IRS National Office for prior approval to challenge a transaction
under audit based on the final PAAR. 149 Of these requests, the IRS
National Office granted 128.150 During this same period, an average
of approximately 2,693,755 partnerships filed federal income tax
returns annually.15' Thus, the number of times the IRS National
Office authorized an examiner to raise the final PAAR during an audit
is miniscule in comparison to the average number of annual returns
filed.
2. Judicial Decisions
The final PAAR has had a similarly modest impact on judicial
decisions. 15 2 To date, there are approximately twenty reported cases in
which the Service initially challenged a transaction under the final
PAAR.m5 Like most of the administrative materials discussed above,
IRS issues a ruling . . . .").
149 Lee A. Sheppard, Government Officials Discuss Partnership, Shelter Issues, TAX
NOTES TODAY, June 4, 2007, 2007 TNT 107-1 (LEXIS); Shop Talk, Agents Will Apply, Courts
May Deny, supra note 27, at 315.
IoSee Shop Talk, Agents Will Apply, Courts May Deny, supra note 27, at 315.
1s1 JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, supra note 2, at 8 tbl.1 (providing reported number of
partnership returns filed between 2003 and 2005); Taukir Hussain Internal Revenue Service
Projections of Federal Tax Return Filings: Calendar Years 2005-2012, SOI BULL., Winter
2005-2006, at 147, 155 tbl.1, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/l2proj.pdf
(providing projected number of partnership returns expected to be filed in 2006 and 2007).
152 In discussing some of these litigated cases, one commentator made the following
observation:
Where is the partnership antiabuse rule in these cases? Wasn't it supposed to make
things easier for the government when a partnership was formed for no other purpose
than to obtain tax benefits that would otherwise not be obtainable? . . . The
government has been arguing reg. section 1.701-2 in son-of-BOSS cases, but courts
have been looking for easier ways to dispose of them.
Lee A. Sheppard, Scorched Earth in Son-of-BOSS Cases, 120 TAX NOTES 9, 14 (2008)
[hereinafter Sheppard, Scorched Earth].
153 See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009);
Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008); Cemco Investors,
L.L.C. v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); RJT Invs. X v. Comm'r, 491 F.3d 732
(8th Cir. 2007); Murfan Farm, L.L.C. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516 (2009); Alpha I, L.P. ex
rel. Sands v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 622 (2008); Jade Trading, L.L.C. v. United States, 80
Fed. Cl. 11 (2007), affd in part, vacated in part, and rev'd in part sub nom. Jade Trading,
L.L.C. ex rel. Ervin v. United States, No. 2008-5045, 2010 WL 1049876 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23,
2010); Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007), rev'd, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Fid. Int'l Currency Advisor A Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, Nos. 05-40151-FDS,
06-40130-FDS, 06-40243-FDS, 06-40244-FDS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94237 (D. Mass. Apr.
18, 2008); Belford Strategic Inv. Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, No. C-04-4309 VRW, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45219 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2005); Long Term Capital Holdings v. United
States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), af'd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005); Tigers Eye
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the Service applied the final PAAR together with one of the
longstanding judicial doctrines, generally the economic substance
doctrine.154 In deciding these cases, the courts based their holdings on
the judicial doctrines rather than the final PAAR.15  With one
exception, no reported case devoted more than a sentence to the final
PAAR. 156
The exception, Countryside Limited Partnership v. Commissioner,
dedicated just two paragraphs to the final PAAR.157 Countryside
involved a highly structured series of transactions spanning a number
of years.158 In basic terms, Countryside owned appreciated real
property that the partnership intended to sell. Two of Countryside's
partners wanted to avoid recognizing gain on the sale; therefore, the
partnership agreed to liquidate their partnership interests.159 To this
end, Countryside distributed recently purchased notes to the partners
in complete liquidation of their interests, and neither partner
Trading, L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1622 (2009); Napoliello v. Conm'r, 97 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1536 (2009); New Millennium Trading, L.L.C. v. Comm'r, [2008 Transfer Binder] 131
T.C. No. 18 (2008), affd, 591 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Petaluma FX Partners, L.L.C. v.
Comm'r, [2008 Transfer Binder] 131 T.C. No. 9 (2008); Countryside L.P. v. Comm'r, 95
T.C.M. (CCH) 1006 (2008); Nussdorf v. Comm'r, 129 T.C. 30 (2007); Domulewicz v. Comm'r,
129 T.C. 11 (2007), aff'd sub nom. Desmet v. Comm'r, 581 F.3d 297 (6th Cir. 2009); Goldberg
v. Comm'r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081 (2007); Santa Monica Pictures, L.L.C. v. Comn'r, 89
T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005).
Additionally, in several litigated cases involving transactions entered into prior to the
effective date of the final PAAR, the courts took note of the regulation but did not consider its
application. See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 246 n.29 (3d Cir. 1998); Brown
Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 F.3d 217, 222 (8th Cir. 1996).
5 See cases cited supra note 153.
15 See, e.g., Klamath, 568 F.3d at 543; Cemco, 515 F.3d at 752; Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl.
at 52; Tigers Eye Trading, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1638; Countryside, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1016-19; Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 52; Santa Monica Pictures, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1204.
Interestingly, several of the cases involved challenges to the final PAAR's validity. In
particular, practitioners' hopes ran high that the United States Court of Federal Claims would
address the regulation's validity in Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007). See, e.g., Shop Talk,
Will the Court of Federal Claims Invalidate the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule?, 102 J. TAX'N
379, 379 (2005) (discussing the possible implications of Jade Trading on the validity and
applicability of the final PAAR). But such hopes were dashed due to intervening developments
concerning the economic substance doctrine. Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit decided Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, thereby establishing the
governing standard for economic substance controversies arising within the circuit. 454 F.3d
1340, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2006). As a result, the Court of Federal Claims relied on Coltec,
holding that the transactions at issue in Jade Trading lacked economic substance. Jade Trading,
80 Fed. Cl. at 52. Thus, there was no need for the court to address the final PAAR's validity.
'See Santa Monica Pictures, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1190 n.84.
157 Countryside, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1010-11.
'
58 See id. at 1006, 1008-09. For a more detailed discussion of the Countryside case, see
Karen C. Burke, Tax Avoidance as a Legitimate Business Purpose, 118 TAX NOTES 1393
(2008); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. et al., Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation: The
Year 2008, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 275, 406 (2009).
159 Countryside, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1008.
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recognized any gain on the transaction.W Thereafter, in separate
transactions, the partnership sold the real property, and the liquidated
partners redeemed their notes. 16 1
The issue in Countryside was whether the liquidated partners
should recognize gain on the distribution of the notes.16 2 Relying on
the economic substance doctrine and the final PAAR, the Service
recharacterized the distribution as a cash distribution, which would
have triggered gain recognition for the liquidated partners.16 3 The
Service argued that the series of transactions-including the
liquidating distribution, the real property sale, and the note
redemption-resulted in the liquidated partners controlling the
proceeds of the real property sale, yet impermissibly avoiding the
related tax liability.
Focusing exclusively on the liquidating distribution, the Tax Court
disagreed and held that the distribution of the notes had economic
substance.16 5 Both Countryside and its partners had legitimate
business reasons for engaging in the liquidating distribution, and that
transaction affected the economic position of the parties.166 Although
tax-advantaged, the court was unwilling to disregard a transaction
with economic substance.
The Tax Court then proceeded to do something that no federal
court had done before-analyze the transaction under the final
PAAR.' 67 Although cursorily, the court walked through each element
of the regulation, ultimately finding that the liquidating distribution
complied with the final PAAR.168 Specifically, the court determined
that the transaction was consistent with the intent of subchapter K.
Countryside was a bona fide partnership, the liquidating distribution
was supported by substantial business purposes, the distribution did
not violate substance over form principles, and the partners'
nonrecognition of gain clearly reflected income.' 69
o Id.
161 Id.
16 2 Id. at 1009.
'
63 Id. at 1016.
'4Id. at 1012.
165 Id. at 1018-19.
166 Id.
16 7 See id. at 1021-22.
168 See id.
to Id. In a footnote, however, the court noted that if the entire series of transactions,
including the liquidating distribution, the real property sale and the redemption of the note, were
taken together, the overall transaction might not clearly reflect income. Id at 1022 n.29. Thus,
the transactions might violate the final PAAR. Id. Since these transactions were not in dispute in
Countryside, the court declined to address them. Id. Rather, such issues will await decision
when the three remaining Countryside cases are heard by the Tax Court and the Court of
Federal Claims. Countryside LP. v. Comm'r, No. 22023-05 (T.C., filed June 8, 2009),
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3. Practitioner Advice
Most surprisingly, the final PAAR has only nominally impacted
professional tax advice. 170 Because practitioners have come to view
the final PAAR as toothless, they simply ignore it.17 1
Practitioners' view of the final PAAR was shaped, in large part, by
the same concerns raised when the regulation was proposed in 1994.
First, practitioners claim that the final PAAR is so vague that they do
not know how to apply it.172 Thus, practitioners continue to do what
they have always done-ensure that a transaction has a business
purpose and otherwise complies with the various judicial doctrines. 17 3
The only new twist is that the client now has to be advised of this
curious, but impotent, regulation.174 Second, practitioners continue to
believe that the final PAAR is invalid, and would not survive a
judicial challenge.77 As a consequence, they do not feel compelled to
take account of the final PAAR when structuring transactions.176
Manchester Promisee, L.L.C. v. United States, No. 1:05-cv-0001 1-MCW (Fed. Cl., filed Jan. 5,
2005), and CLP Promisee, L.L.C. v. United States, No. 1:05-cv-00012-MCW (Fed. Cl., filed
Jan. 5, 2005).
1o See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 58-59; Gunn, supra note 9, at 173.
171 See Gunn, supra note 9, at 159; Burke, supra note 158, at 1393; Shop Talk, Agents Will
Apply, Courts May Deny, supra note 27, at 314; Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Shelter Guidance
Coming, TAX NoTEs TODAY, June 12, 2002, 2002 TNT 113-3 (LEXIS) ("The partnership
antiabuse rule, reg. section 1.701-2, is reputed to be toothless. It is widely viewed as ineffectual
and meaningless by the partnership bar.").
172 See Banoff, Use and Misuse ofAnti-Abuse Rules, supra note 15, at 835 (noting that
overly broad and vague rules provide no guidance in individual situations); Frank V. Battle, Jr.,
The Appropriateness ofAnti-Abuse Rules in the U.S. Income Tax System, 48 TAX LAW. 801, 806
(1995) (questioning the "wisdom and effectiveness of an anti-abuse rule that spawns more and
more rules, examples, and explanations"); Lipton, Calm After the Storm?, supra note 137, at 70
("Significant ambiguities in the anti-abuse Regulations make it difficult to determine whether
the rules apply to a particular transaction.").
173 See Lipton, Calm After the Storm?, supra note 137, at 73-74; Sheppard, Not So Bad,
Apparently, supra note 137, at 465.
174 See Lipton, Calm After the Storm?, supra note 137, at 74.
17s See, e.g., id. ("[Tihe broadly worded anti-abuse Regulations may not survive judicial
scrutiny."); William F. Nelson, The Limits of Literalism: The Effect of Substance Over Form,
Clear Reflection and Business Purpose Considerations On the Proper Interpretation of
Subchapter K, 73 TAXEs 641, 642 (1995) ("I believe it goes without saying that any interpretive
approach that proposes to overlook the plain meaning of statutory language that has survived the
constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment ought to raise eyebrows."); Sheldon I.
Banoff, Anatomy ofan Antiabuse Rule: What's Really Wrong with Reg. Section 1.701-2, TAX
NoTEs TODAY, Mar. 20, 1995, 1995 TNT 56-84 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Banoff, What's Really
Wrong with 1.701-2] ("The antiabuse rule appears to extend existing law and go beyond
congressional principles."); see also Shop Talk, Ninth Circuit Invalidates Anti-Abuse Rule; Is
Reg. 1.701-2 Similarly Flawed?, 83 J. TAX'N 380, 380-81 (1995) (sharing the thoughts of
attorney William H. Caudill of Fulbright & Jaworski concerning the final PAAR).
The final PAAR's intent of subchapter K standard is particularly problematic to
practitioners. They believe it applies the traditional judicial doctrines in an unprecedented and
impermissible manner. See Lipton, Calm After the Storm?, supra note 137, at 73-74; Nelson,
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E. The Failure of the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule
Sixteen years of experience with the final PAAR lead to one
conclusion: the regulation failed. And it failed in the most distinctive
and unexpected way, especially in light of the controversy the
regulation generated; the final PAAR is irrelevant. In an era marked
by prolific tax abuse, there is scant evidence of the final PAAR's
existence, let alone its application. 1 77 The Service rarely raises it, the
courts rarely apply it, and practitioners rarely consider it. 78
Two important developments, each occurring after the Treasury
issued the final PAAR, illustrate the regulation's failure. First,
partnership tax shelters flooded the market with devastating effect. 1 79
The Treasury had hoped that the final PAAR would discourage
taxpayers from entering into abusive partnership transactions, but the
regulation had no such impact. On the contrary, taxpayers paid little
heed to the regulation.
Even worse, many partnership tax shelters marketed after the
Treasury finalized the PAAR strongly resembled the very examples
of abusive transactions set forth in the regulation. For instance,
Example 7 of the regulation describes a rent-stripping transaction that
would violate the final PAAR.180 Yet rent-stripping transactions were
common in the years following the Treasury's issuance of the final
PAAR, and the Service was ultimately forced to issue a separate
supra, at 658. For excellent discussions of the final PAAR's validity, compare Cunningham &
Repetti, supra note 8, at 50-55 (concluding that the final PAAR is valid), with McKEE ET AL.,
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, 1 1.05[5] (concluding that the final
PAAR is invalid).
176 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 34.
'
77 See supra Part I.D.
178 The one notable exception is Lee Sheppard. Over the past decade, Sheppard has written
a plethora of articles addressing abusive partnership transactions. In many of these articles, she
repeatedly wonders about the PAAR's whereabouts. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Erroneous
Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 118 TAX NOTES 259; Lee A. Sheppard, The
Fairies, the Magic Circle, and Partnership Options, 90 TAX NOTES 721 (2001); Lee A.
Sheppard, Government Officials Discuss Partnership, Shelter Issues, TAX NOTES TODAY, June
1, 2007, 2007 TNT 107-1 (LEXIS); Lee A. Sheppard, Treasury Begins to Shut Down Bond
Premium Games, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 21, 1995, 95 TNT 55-13 (LEXIS); Sheppard,
Scorched Earth, supra note 152, at 14.
t79 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
1soTreas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 7 (as amended in 1995). while a detailed discussion of
rent-stripping transactions is beyond the scope of this Article, a general definition of such
transactions might be useful. Rent stripping transactions are "multiple-party transactions
intended to allow one party to realize rental or other income from property or service contracts
and to allow another party to report deductions related to that income (for example, depreciation
or rental expenses)." I.R.S. Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334.
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notice proscribing such transactions. 8 1 The final PAAR itself did
nothing.
Similarly, Example 8 addresses a transaction involving the
improper duplication of tax losses through a partnership
distribution.' 8 2 Despite this example, loss-duplicating transactions
proliferated following the PAAR's finalization. Again, the Service
had to take separate remedial action, issuing a specific notice
prohibiting these transactions.183
Second, Congress and the Treasury continued to issue targeted
anti-abuse provisions. Most notably, Congress enacted a series of
provisions specifically addressing the abusive partnership transactions
included in the final PAAR's examples. For instance, in 2004
Congress enacted a narrowly tailored anti-abuse rule intended to
prevent the transactions addressed in Example 8 of the final
regulation.18 Thus, partnerships are now required to make
adjustments to their basis in property following certain distributions
in order to prevent the improper duplication of losses.185 Had the final
PAAR more effectively addressed this abusive transaction,
congressional action might not have been necessary.186
181 See I.R.S. Notice 2003-55, 2003-34 C.B. 395.
182 Tres. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 8 (as amended in 1995). In this example, Taxpayer A
owns a loss asset that he would like to sell to a third party. As part of this transaction, Taxpayer
A also would like to duplicate the asset's loss. Thus, Taxpayer A forms a partnership with his
brother and his brother's spouse, and Taxpayer A contributes the loss asset, which is thereafter
leased to a third party for three years, to the partnership. Several years later, the partnership
liquidates Taxpayer A's interest, distributing investment property to him. The partnership does
not make a Section 754 election and, thus, it makes no basis adjustments following the
distribution. Taxpayer A then sells such investment property, and recognizes a loss equal to the
built in loss in the property he originally contributed to the partnership. Since the partnership did
not make a Section 754 election, the partnership also recognizes a loss, which is shared by A's
brother and his spouse, when the leased property is sold to the third party. Id.
If the partnership had made an election under Section 754, then it would have adjusted the
basis of its property following the distribution to Taxpayer A. See I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 754 (2006).
For a more detailed discussion of the elective-basis adjustment, see MCKEE ET AL.,TAXATION
OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, at Ifl 25.01-.07.
'
83 See I.R.S. Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690; I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255.
184American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833, 118 Stat. 1418,
1589-91 (2004) (codified at I.R.C. § 734(b), (d)).
185I.R.C. § 734(b), (d) (2006). A partnership must reduce its basis in its assets if there is a
distribution of property to a partner with respect to which there is a substantial basis reduction.
Id. § 732(b). A distribution triggers a substantial basis reduction if: (1) the distributee partner
recognizes a loss in excess of $250,000 with respect to the distribution; or (2) the basis of the
distributed property to the distributee partner exceeds the partnership's basis in such property
immediately before the distribution by more than $250,000. Id. § 734(b)(2), (d)(1).
186 Additionally, Congress enacted a provision eliminating the abusive transaction
illustrated by Example 11 of the final PAAR. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 11 (as amended in
1995). Still, in 1997, Congress amended Section 732, providing a more equitable, less
abuse-prone means of allocating basis among distributed property. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1061, 111 Stat. 788, 945-46 (codified at LR.C. § 732(c)). For a more
detailed discussion of Section 732 and basis allocations following a liquidating distribution, see
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More generally, if confidence in the final PAAR had been higher,
neither Congress nor the Treasury would likely have felt it necessary
to promulgate targeted anti-abuse provisions proscribing abusive
transactions that were seemingly within the regulation's domain. If
the many anti-abuse rules added to subchapter K since the final
PAAR's issuance serves as any evidence, confidence in the regulation
was not high. Nor should it have been; the final PAAR was a
remarkable failure.
II. WHY THE PARTNERSHIP ANTI-ABUSE RULE FAILED
There is no one reason why the final PAAR failed. Yet the
dynamic relationship between the Treasury and practitioners,
particularly during the PAAR's first six months, had a unique and
indelible impact on the regulation. Practitioners' venomous response
to the PAAR, which continued long after the Treasury finalized the
PAAR, was devastating. Even worse, the practitioner reaction
triggered other factors that ultimately contributed to the PAAR's
demise-the Service's hesitance to apply the regulation and the
Treasury's decision to make significant changes to the regulation. But
the mystery remains. How could a regulation that generated such
intense emotions from the government and practitioners alike founder
so terribly and so quickly?
A. The Practitioners' Role
Although practitioners failed to convince the Treasury to withdraw
the proposed PAAR, they did succeed in their ultimate goal of
eviscerating the regulation. As previously discussed, practitioners
waged a bitter campaign against the proposed PAAR.'8 7 And that
campaign did not end when the Treasury finalized the regulation.
Most importantly, a respected cadre of former tax officials
commenced an unprecedented letter writing campaign, expressing to
the Treasury their displeasure with the final PAAR.'88 Specifically,
McKEE ET AL., TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, at 19.01[2].
'
87 See supra Part I.B.2.
'See Letter from Donald C. Alexander et al. to Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec'y (Tax
Pol'y), Dep't of the Treasury (Aug. 18, 1995), reprinted in Commentators Say Partnership
Antiabuse Rule Doesn't Satisfy Fundamental Principles for a Workable Tax System, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 18, 1995, 95 TNT 175-28 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Alexander Group Comments];
Letter from Lawrence B. Gibbs & John S. Nolan, Miller & Chevalier, to Leslie B. Samuels,
Assistant Sec'y (Tax Pol'y), Dep't of the Treasury (Aug. 23, 1995), reprinted in Partnership
Antiabuse Rule Is Broader Than Necessary, Say Miller & Chevalier Attorneys, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 23, 1995, 95 TNT 175-27 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Gibbs & Nolan Comments]; Letter
from Kenneth W. Gideon, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec'y
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these former judges and administrative officials believed that a broad
freestanding anti-abuse rule like the final PAAR could not be applied
objectively or predictably.18 9 They argued that this uncertainty, in
turn, would trigger larger, more systemic problems, including a
reduction in market activity and an erosion of the tax system's
integrity.190 To them, the final PAAR was a dangerous regulation and
an even more dangerous precedent for agency rulemaking. '9
These extraordinary letters raise a fascinating question. Why
would such an esteemed group of former tax officials send these
coordinated letters almost one year after the Treasury finalized the
regulation? Although most of the letters called for the Treasury to
withdraw the final PAAR,192 it is inconceivable that these lawyers
believed withdrawal was a realistic possibility, especially considering
the Treasury's well-documented commitment to the regulation. 193 It is
more likely that these lawyers were trying to manage the future of the
final PAAR, as well as the future of broad anti-abuse rules in
general.'9
(Tax Pol'y), Dep't of the Treasury (Aug. 29, 1995), reprinted in Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
Attorney Says Partnership Antiabuse Rule Encourages 'Standardless Challenges' by IRS
Agents, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 29, 1995, 95 TNT 175-26 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Gideon
Letter]; see also Samuel Thompson Jr., Ex-Government Officials Challenge Partnership
Anti-Abuse Reg: An Analysis, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. I1, 1995, 95 TNT 242-47 (LEXIS).
189 See Alexander Group Comments, supra note 188; Gibbs & Nolan Comments, supra
note 188; Gideon Letter, supra note 188.
'See, e.g., Alexander Group Comments, supra note 188.
191 See, e.g., id.
'See Alexander Group Comments, supra note 188; Gibbs & Nolan Comments, supra
note 188.
193 But see Letter from David H. Brockway to Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec'y (Tax
Pol'y), Dep't of the Treasury (Sept. 18, 1995), reprinted in Brockway Sees Necessity for
Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 18, 1995, 1995 TNT 190-24 (LEXIS)
[hereinafter Brockway Comments]. Mr. Brockway, a former chief of staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, wrote a letter to the Treasury expressing his support for the final PAAR
in response to the aforementioned letters of opposition:
I am writing not because I think that there is any realistic chance that the case made
in the correspondence would cause Treasury to reverse field and withdraw the
regulations (nor, I suspect, did you [sic] correspondents write with that objective) but
because I am concerned that their intended audience might be lulled into believing
that their expressed views represent a consensus among former government officials.
Id.
194See Alexander Group Comments, supra note 188 ("We do not believe that the best
interests of either the Government or the taxpayers will be served by this regulation or similar
broad anti-abuse rules not grounded in or authorized by statutory provisions in the Code.");
Gibbs & Nolan Comments, supra note 188 ("Our real concern is wider than these particular
regulations. They represent a type of policy approach to solving tax avoidance problems that is
far broader then [sic] we think is necessary and that, by its nature, creates uncertainties as to the
application of broad areas of the tax law that are vital to planning business transactions.");
Gideon Letter, supra note 188 ("I hope that the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue
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B. The Service's Role
The actions of the Service reflected a deep ambivalence toward the
final PAAR. Although publicly proclaiming its steadfast commitment
to the regulation,195 the Service's conduct was less convincing. The
Service, together with the Treasury, fought a bruising battle over the
proposed PAAR, and its finalization failed to quell the controversy. In
the PAAR's first year alone, the incoming chairmen of both
congressional tax-writing committees, 196 a host of former government
officials,19 7 and myriad tax practitioners challenged the decision to
finalize the regulation.198 In light of such uniform and passionate
disapproval, the Service might have begun to doubt the wisdom of the
final PAAR.
Once finalized, the Service neglected the final PAAR, rarely
challenging a transaction under the regulation.199 Perhaps the Service
wanted to avoid drawing further ire from the final PAAR's powerful
opponents. Or perhaps the Service was concerned about the
regulation's validity and feared that litigation might lead to a
200
successful challenge.
Service will not in the future issue similar 'free standing' anti-abuse rules."); see also Sheryl
Stratton, They're Back ... Washington Lawyers Attack Anti-Abuse Rules, 68 TAx NOTES 1263,
1263 (1995) ("The letter-writing campaign seems to be a concerted cage-rattling effort to get
guidance that limits the regulation's application and to deter Treasury from ever trying anything
like this again."). Former government officials, however, were not unanimous in their
opposition to the final PAAR and broad anti-abuse rules, more broadly. See Brockway
Comments, supra note 193 ("[O]n balance, the regulations are an important and necessary step
to protect the fairness of the tax system and the rights of the vast majority of taxpayers that do
not engage in the types of tax driven and artificial transactions that are the targets of the
regulations."); Letter from Terrill A. Hyde, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to Editor, Tax Notes
Today (Mar. 30, 1995), reprinted in Anti-Abuse Rule Rhetoric Is Full of Holes, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Apr. 13, 1995, 95 TNT 72-49 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Hyde Letter].
'
95 See Juliann Avakian Martin, Government Aims to Finalize Partnership Antiabuse Rules
by Year's End, 94 TAX NOTES INT'L 200-1 (1994); F.R. Nagle, Officials Stress Partnership
Antiabuse Rules Open to Revisions, 94 TAX NOTES INT'L 153-1 (1994); Sheppard, Partnership
Antiabuse Rule is Here to Stay, supra note 111.
1 6 See supra note 68.
'
97 See sources cited supra note 188.198 See supra Part I.B.2.
'See supra Part I.D.1.
200 lese concerns were well founded. In the few litigated cases involving the final PAAR,
taxpayers did challenge the regulation's validity. See, e.g., Plaintiffs First Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Relating to Invalidity of Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2) at 2, Jade Trading, L.L.C.
v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 558 (2004) (No. 03-2164T), 2003 WL 25656589 (noting severe
criticism by leading members of the federal tax bar and alleging unconstitutional vagueness);
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Relating to
Invalidity of Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2) at 5, Jade Trading, L.L.C. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 558
(2004) (No. 03-2164T), 2003 WL 25626574 (describing the final PAAR as the "single most
criticized regulation in the past 20 years"); Original Brief for Petitioners at 216-26, Santa
Monica Pictures, L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (Nos. 6163-03, 6164-03),
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The final PAAR's limited use may also have stemmed from a very
different group within the Service-field examiners. These
examiners, whose caseloads are notoriously high, 201 may have chosen
not to challenge transactions under the final PAAR because the
regulation's use required prior approval from the IRS National
Office. 20 2 Thus, it might have seemed easier and less time-consuming
to challenge transactions on grounds other than the final PAAR.
In addition to these possibilities, one might also posit that the
Service was simply being judicious in applying the regulation. The
final PAAR was intended to be a measure of last resort, only to be
applied in those rare instances where a transaction complies with the
literal language of subchapter K but violates its underlying
principles.20 3 To the extent that the Service could challenge a
partnership transaction on narrower grounds, sound tax policy might
dictate that it do so.2m
Ultimately, the reason why the Service failed to apply the final
PAAR more robustly remains a mystery.205 Regardless of the reason,
the final PAAR's disuse was a major blow to its effectiveness.
Practitioners believed that the Service failed to challenge more
transactions under the final PAAR because of its internal ambivalence
towards the regulation. And this perception had a crippling effect on
2005 WL 1328520 (alleging that the final PAAR lacks statutory foundation, violates separation
of powers, and is unconstitutionally vague). The arguments raised by taxpayers when
challenging the final PAAR's validity typically mirrored those raised by practitioners who
opposed the PAAR. See supra Part I.B.2.a. For instance, in Jade Trading, the taxpayer asserted
that the final PAAR overrules decades of precedent regarding the business purpose doctrine,
overrides the literal language of the Code, and is unconstitutionally vague. See Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Support of First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Relating to Invalidity
of Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2), supra, at 7-8.
201 In 2002, the last year in which data is available from the Service, field service
examiners reviewed 171,576 returns, 4,693 of which involved partnerships. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., FIELD EXAMINATION VOLUMES BY EXAMINATION CLASS, INCLUDING EITC,
FISCAL YEARS 1996-2002 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/rtctab5c.xls.
2m See Banoff, Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, supra note 15, at 841 ("National
Office involvement may act as a disincentive. To the extent that assertion of anti-abuse rules
requires clearance from the National Office as a condition precedent, agents are less likely to go
that route in the first place.").
203 T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109, 110 ("The anti-abuse rule in the final regulation is
expected primarily to affect a relatively small number of partnership transactions that make
inappropriate use of the rules of subchapter K.").
2 See Kenneth W. Gideon, Use, Abuse, and Anti-Abuse: Policy Considerations Affecting
the Nature of Regulatory Guidance, 73 TAXES 637, 639 (1995) [hereinafter Gideon, Regulatory
Guidance] (discussing policy drawbacks of anti-abuse rules).
2 Indeed, it is likely that this mystery could only be solved through an elaborate research
project well beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, the roots of the mystery probably lie
within the unique dynamics of the Service, including the revolving door between public service
and private practice, and the role of practitioners in shaping tax law and policy.
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the final PAAR's legitimacy in the eyes of an already skeptical tax
community. If the Service itself had doubts about the final PAAR,
then taxpayers had no incentive to comply with it.
C. The Treasury's Role
The Treasury also played a leading role in the final PAAR's
demise. Although extreme in much of their commentary, the
regulation's opponents were correct in one important respect-the
final PAAR is deeply flawed. In its proposed form, the PAAR was a
broad anti-abuse rule, reminding taxpayers to behave well in an area
teeming with temptations to behave badly. 206 But the Treasury strayed
from its original design in the final PAAR, suffocating the regulation
with details.207 The final PAAR is narrower, more technical, and more
complex than the proposed version. Ironically, the final regulation
bears a striking resemblance to the troublesome provisions of
subchapter K that the Treasury had hoped the PAAR would
counterbalance.208
To mollify the regulation's detractors, the Treasury made several
changes to the PAAR after its proposal. But these changes rendered
the final regulation structurally unsound. First, the Treasury added a
list of seven non-exhaustive factors plus the "super-factor" to the final
PAAR. 2 09 The Treasury hoped these factors would give taxpayers
additional guidance when determining whether a transaction violated
the regulation. Nonetheless, the Treasury provided them for
illustrative purposes only.210 The Service is authorized to consider
other unstated factors in its analysis of a transaction. Likewise, the
weight afforded to any particular factor is fluid, depending entirely on
the partnership transaction under review.
206 See, e.g., Richardson Remarks, supra note 16 ("One possible answer [for the strong
opposition to the final PAAR] may be that the regulation is simple and to-the-point and reminds
taxpayers and their representatives that they have a responsibility for determining whether their
transactions are abuses of the tax system.").
2 See George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson
from History, 54 SMU L. REv. 209, 224 n.87 (2001) (noting that the proposed PAAR had "some
real bite," but the Treasury severely watered down the final version).
208 See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr: TAXATION OF PASS-THROUGH
ENTITIES, MEMORANDUM No. 1, at 6-7 (1995) [hereinafter ALI MEMORANDUM NO. 1]; see also
Gunn, supra note 9, at 175 (describing the historical evolution of the regulations and their
increasing technicality); Banoff, What's Really Wrong with 1.701-2, supra note 175
("Ironically, the partnership antiabuse rule itself runs counter to the policy of encouraging
simplicity, flexibility, and equity.").
w Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c) (as amended in 1995); see also supra notes 122-27 and
accompanying text.
21OTreas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c).
211 Id.
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If considered separately, each stated factor legitimately signals a
suspect transaction.2 12 Thus, a factor's inclusion in a list indicative of
tax abuse is hardly controversial. Yet the Treasury's decision to
include these factors, including the "super-factor," in the final PAAR
creates unnecessary confusion for taxpayers.2 13 For instance, the
regulation fails to provide any guidance about the relative weight to
be placed on the presence or absence of any of the stated factors. 2 14
Likewise, some factors require comparative benchmarks, but the final
PAAR is silent on how to apply these factors.215
Second, the Treasury added numerous examples to the final
PAAR. By design, these examples are incredibly narrow, expressly
limited to their facts and circumstances. Indeed, any change in an
example could affect the Treasury's conclusion regarding the final
PAAR's applicability.216 Further, the Treasury did not intend the
examples to delineate the boundary between permissible and
impermissible transactions. 217 Like the factors, the Treasury included
the examples for illustrative purposes only.
The examples' narrow design feature, however, only exacerbates
the confusion surrounding application of the final PAAR.218 Again,
the relative weight the Treasury affords to an example's particular
facts or circumstances is uncertain. Similarly, it is unclear what facts
or circumstances, or combination thereof, would affect the outcome
of a given example.
Even worse, the final PAAR's examples are internally
inconsistent, creating a perception that the key factor in determining
whether a transaction violates the regulation is the Treasury's view of
the transaction's social or political value. 219 To illustrate, the final
PAAR includes one example, Example 8, where a partnership is used
2 12 See Gunn, supra note 9, at 165.
213 See, e.g., Battle, supra note 172, at 806; Gunn, supra note 9, at 165.
2 14 See Gunn, supra note 9, at 165-66.
215 Am. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: TAXATION OF PASS-THROUGH
ENTITIES, MEMORANDUM No. 2, at 61-62 (1996); Yin, supra note 207, at 163.
216 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (as amended in 1995).
217 Id.
218 See Upton, Calm After the Storm?, supra note 137, at 69 (arguing that the limited
examples provide only minimal guidance); Richard M. Lipton, IRS Improves Partnership
Anti-Abuse Regs., but Major Problems Remain, 82 J. TAX'N 132, 134-35 (1995) [hereinafter
Upton, Major Problems Remain].219 See McKEE ET AL., TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, at
1.05[3]; Banoff, What's Really Wrong With 1.701-2, supra note 175; Sheryl Stratton, Revised
Partnership Antiabuse Reg Still Subject to Debate, Revision, 66 TAX NOTES 647, 648 (1995)
[hereinafter Stratton, Subject to Debate]; Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Shelter Guidance
Coming, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 11, 2002, 2002 TNT 113-3 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Sheppard,
Partnership Shelter Guidance Coming]; ("Practitioners complain about the regulation's internal
contradictions and obviously [sic] political blessing of certain transactions that would otherwise
be considered offensive.").
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to improperly duplicate a loss. 2 20 Although the transaction has some
221 vilts "
modicum of business purpose, it violates the final PAAR. The
example seems to establish a stringent business purpose requirement,
finding that no business purpose would be significant when compared
to the transaction's tax benefits.222 Yet the final PAAR also includes
examples involving partnership transactions that generate significant
tax benefits but lack much business purose.22 3 Taken together, these
examples are difficult to reconcile. 2f4 The determinative factor
appears to be the Treasury's subjective valuation of the underlying
transaction. Partnership transactions that the Treasury considers
inoffensive or congressionally sanctioned comply with the final
PAAR; others violate it. And this struck another blow to the final
PAAR, severely damaging both its credibility and its coherence.
The Treasury would likely respond that it included the factors and
examples in the final PAAR to provide taxpayers with as much
guidance as possible without sacrificing the regulation's flexibility.
Taxpayers are continually developing novel partnership tax shelters
and, hence, it would be impossible for the Treasury to provide more
definitive guidance. Although laudable, the Treasury's attempt to
2 20Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 8 (as amended in 1995). For a discussion of Example 8,
see supra note 182.
221 In this example, the partnership's three-year lease of the property involves real
economic risk and return. For instance, the value of the loss asset could change during the lease
term, thereby eliminating the desired loss duplication. See McKEE ET AL., TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, at 1 1.05[3]; Battle, supra note 172, at 806 n.18
(discussing Example 10, which following the Treasury's amendment of the PAAR in 1995,
became the current Example 8); Lipton, Calm After the Storm?, supra note 137, at 69; Lipton,
Major Problems Remain, supra note 218, at 135; Stratton, Subject to Debate, supra note 219, at
648.
2 2 2 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 8.
223 Id. § 1.701-2(d), exs. 2, 4, 6 (as amended in 1995). For example, consider Example 6.
This example involves a partnership formed by two high bracket taxpayers and a corporation
with net operating loss carry-forwards in order to own a building eligible for the
low-income housing tax credit. Because the corporate partner cannot use any of the depreciation
deductions or tax credits attributable to the building, these tax benefits are allocated entirely to
the high-bracket taxpayers, thus allowing them to shelter other, unrelated income. Id. §
1.701-2(d), ex. 6. Yet the Treasury blessed this transaction, despite its significant tax benefits
and insignificant business purpose apart from tax savings. Id.; see also MCKEE ET AL.,
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, at 1.05[3]; Lipton, Calm After
the Storm?, supra note 137, at 69 ("The criticism of the examples in the Regulations has not
been limited to those with 'unfavorable' results; some of the examples in which the anti-abuse
rules do not apply are equally mystifying and unclear."); Sheppard, Grudging Acceptance, supra
note 107 (reporting one attorney's view of Example 4 as "intellectually dishonest" because of
the high level of tax avoidance inherent in the transaction).
224 One might argue that these examples are not inconsistent because partnership
transactions involving low-income housing tax credits are congressionally sanctioned. However,
even transactions involving congressionally sanctioned tax benefits can be abusive. See, e.g.,
Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, modified by I.R.S. Announcement 2009-69, 2009-40
I.R.B. 1175 (wind energy production tax credits); I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, 2005-1 C.B. 630
(sale-in, lease-out transactions).
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balance taxpayers' desire for additional guidance and its need for
flexibility backfired. Indeed, no guidance would have been preferable
to the incomplete guidance set forth in the final PAAR. The factors
and examples added to the regulation have muddled it to the point of
incoherence.
The result is a worst-of-all-worlds scenario. Taxpayers trying to
apply the final PAAR to legitimate partnership transactions are
plagued by confusion. They understand that the regulation is not
intended to interfere with legitimate partnership transactions. They
also understand that there are facts and circumstances-some known,
some unknown-that will determine whether their transaction
violates the final PAAR. What they do not understand, however, is
how all these facts, circumstances, factors, super-factors, and
examples work together. After accounting for all of the final PAAR's
limitations, qualifications, and variables, whatever conceptual
understanding these taxpayers initially had likely disappears. 225 Thus,
they do what many well-meaning taxpayers do when navigating
subchapter K's complexities-give up. Simply put, these taxpayers
stop trying to comply with the final PAAR.22 6
The confusion of those entering into legitimate partnership
transactions has had another, more nefarious, consequence. It has
allowed taxpayers engaging in abusive partnership transactions to
camouflage their true objections to the final PAAR. Since its
proposal, the PAAR has presented only one problem to these
taxpayers: it might work, thereby disabling the very lucrative market
for partnership tax shelters. For obvious reasons, these taxpayers
could not criticize the regulation on the grounds that it was likely to
succeed. But they could take up the cause of the taxpayers engaging
in legitimate partnership transactions. Thus, under the guise of
complexity and market concerns, taxpayers engaging in abusive
partnership transactions were able to viciously attack the PAAR
without disclosing their true agenda. And they succeeded. Partnership
225 See Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 251; see also Sheppard,
Partnership Shelter Guidance Coming, supra note 219.
226 See Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 252. Lokken writes:
A large number of partnerships thus seem to be governed by what might be called an
'intuitive subchapter K.' Taxpayers and tax advisers who want to comply account for
partnership transactions in ways that are consistent with their conceptions of the
basic aims of subchapter K; others account as adventurously as they believe the IRS
is likely to tolerate. IRS auditors challenge partnership accounting only if it seems to
be seriously out of whack. No one has the ability, resources, and incentive to figure
out exactly what the rules require.
Id.
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tax shelters continue to thrive and the final PAAR has been unable to
do anything about it.
Ill. BUILDING A BE'TER PARTNERSHIP ANTI-ABUSE RULE
The PAAR's tragic fate was likely sealed before the Treasury even
finalized the regulation. The actions and reactions of the Treasury, the
Service, and practitioners in the months following the PAAR's
proposal disabled the regulation, denying it any chance of accretive
legal development. But the final PAAR's failure does not discredit the
notion that a broad anti-abuse rule could effectively combat abusive
partnership transactions. Given the changes that the Treasury made to
the final PAAR, it can hardly be described as a broad anti-abuse rule.
Thus, it remains possible, perhaps even likely, that a broad anti-abuse
rule could work in subchapter K.
To this end, this Part suggests that the Treasury revise the PAAR,
unwinding the damage of those fateful six months that culminated in
the final PAAR's issuance. In doing so, the Treasury would return the
PAAR to its origins as a broad anti-abuse rule and finally give the
regulation a legitimate chance to fight the tax shelters endemic to
subchapter K. Although a revised PAAR would not solve subchapter
K's deepest structural problems-nothing but fundamental reform
could do that-a revised PAAR would help support subchapter K,
while presenting little downside risk.
A. Back to Basics: The Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Version 2.0
A revised PAAR should be short, simple, and broad. Thus, I
propose the following streamlined general anti-abuse rule for
subchapter K: if a partnership is formed or availed of in connection
with a transaction that substantially reduces the present value of the
partners' aggregate federal income tax liability in a manner that is
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K, the Service may recast
the transaction for federal income tax purposes, as appropriate, to
achieve tax results that are consistent with the intent of subchapter K.
Like current law, a revised PAAR would include guidance
regarding the intent of subchapter K. I propose using the final
PAAR's definition-the intent of subchapter K is to permit taxpayers
to conduct joint business or investment activities in a manner that
affords them flexibility in structuring their economic arrangements
but does not trigger an entity-level tax.227 Implicit in this intent are
several familiar foundational principles. The partnership must be bona
2 27 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a).
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fide and the transaction must have a substantial business purpose,
comply with substance over form principles, and clearly reflect
income.m
A revised PAAR would also preserve the final PAAR's scope,
only applying to the small number of abusive partnership transactions
that cannot be challenged under the specific provisions of subchapter
K. The regulation would not serve as the primary method of
challenging a partnership transaction. On the contrary, a revised
PAAR would be a provision of last resort.
The most notable changes to a revised PAAR, however, would be
the deletions. First, this proposal eliminates the principal purpose of
tax reduction standard and, thus, the regulation's application would
no longer depend on the partners' state of mind. 29 Second, this
proposal omits the non-exclusive list of factors, including the
"super-factor," that is currently applied to determine whether a
transaction violates the final PAAR. Third, this proposal does not
include examples.
Finally, in connection with the PAAR's revision, I also propose
that the Service terminate its current enforcement restrictions.
Examiners would no longer be required to seek prior approval before
challenging a transaction under the PAAR.
B. Addition by Subtraction:
The Benefits of the Revised Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule
A revised PAAR would offer a return to the hopeful days of 1994,
and would reverse the missteps of the PAAR's first months. It would
be a simple, unencumbered reminder that compliance with subchapter
K's complicated and technical rules is not sufficient; compliance with
the foundational principles underlying the federal income tax system
is also required. This, in turn, would allow tax lawyers to be lawyers,
freeing them to exercise judgment in structuring partnership
transactions.
228 See id.
22 9 The principal purpose of tax reduction standard, contained in both the proposed and
final PAAR, is troublesome. This standard makes the partners' motivations for entering into the
transaction determinative. If the partners engaged in the transaction with the goal of
substantially reducing their aggregate federal income tax liability, then they run afoul of the
final PAAR. If, however, the partners accidentally stumble on a transaction that substantially
reduces their aggregate federal income tax liability, then the transaction would survive scrutiny
under the regulation. The results of both transactions are improper, yet the Service is only
permitted to remedy the abuse when the partners intended to achieve such results. Given the
chronic abuse of subchapter K, the Treasury's decision to condition the final PAAR's
application on the taxpayer's state of mind is curiously misguided. ALI, 1999 REPORTERS'
STUDY, supra note 19, at 116; Banoff, Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, supra note 15, at
833-34; Battle, supra note 172, at 803.
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Indeed, a revised PAAR could be transformative. After sixteen
ineffectual years, the Treasury might finally empower the PAAR to
combat abusive partnership transactions. If a revised PAAR were to
succeed in eliminating some of subchapter K's worst excesses, as
seems likely, it would provide structural support to subchapter K,
which remains deeply in crisis.
1. Saying What It Means
Revising the PAAR would give the Treasury a second chance to
say exactly what it means with respect to subchapter K. Simply put, it
could remind taxpayers that subchapter K's unique combination of
flexibility, complexity, and low enforcement does not absolve them of
the obligation to comply with the federal income tax system's
foundational principles. Even in subchapter K, transactions must
comply with those ground rules. And a revised PAAR would say this
simply and directly.
In doing so, a revised PAAR could reverse a troublesome trend in
the practice of partnership taxation. In recent years, practitioners have
clamored for an increasing amount of guidance from the Treasury and
the Service and, for the most part, the government has acquiesced.230
This trend toward increased guidance has transformed the profession
by reducing the risk associated with providing partnership tax advice.
Practitioners are increasingly required to navigate subchapter K's
maze of technical rules, and decreasingly required to use independent
legal judgment when structuring partnership transactions.23 1
If the Treasury revised the PAAR, the regulation would require
practitioners to exercise judgment in structuring complex partnership
230See Richard M. Lipton, "We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us": More Thoughts on
Hyperlexis, 47 TAX LAW. 1, 3-9 (1993) [hereinafter Lipton, Thoughts on Hyperlexis]; Olson,
Observations from the Frontlines, supra note 12, at 576.
231 See Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54
SMU L. REv. 149, 151 (2001) [hereinafter Bankman, Sociology of Tax]; Pamela Olson, Some
Thoughts on Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAx LAW. 817, 825 (1995). Professor Stanley Surrey
described a similar problem arising under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. His words are apt
today:
Given such a detailed, often mathematically-oriented statute, it becomes impossible
to fly by the seat of one's tax pants. Tax intuition and instinct are of no help in the
face of myriads of rules turning on eighty percent of this or that, one year from this
or that date, this or that being done before this or that date, this or that attribution of
stock ownership, and so on. Clearly, such "flyers" are passd under the present Code.
While this is not a serious calamity, there is a need to provide working room for the
use of tax instinct.
Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management
of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 673, 699 (1969).
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transactions.232 Practitioners could no longer hide behind subchapter
K's complex, technical provisions. On the contrary, they would have
to account for fundamental tax principles when applying subchapter
K. Most importantly, tax opinions would likely reflect the increased
risk associated with providing partnership tax advice, presumably
becoming more comprehensive and more qualified. Thus, shifting tax
risk back to practitioners could help reduce the demand for tax
shelters.
2. Meaning What It Says
By finally saying what it means, a revised PAAR would have its
first real chance to fight partnership tax shelters. A revised PAAR,
with its combination of flexibility and simplicity, would be uniquely
situated to supplement subchapter K. As previously discussed,
Congress has been steadfast in its commitment to flexibility in
partnership taxation, and this commitment has spawned matchless
complexity.233 These attributes, coupled with insufficient enforcement
resources, have turned subchapter K into a virulent breeding ground
for tax shelters.
A revised PAAR might offer a partial antidote. It would offset
partnership taxation's complexity with simplicity, reminding
taxpayers that they need to follow the rules, even in subchapter K. At
the same time, a revised PAAR's flexibility would be well matched to
subchapter K's flexibility, thus neutralizing the endless manipulations
of partnership taxation. If, as some observers believe, subchapter K
allows taxpayers to do virtually anything, then subchapter K needs an
anti-abuse rule nimble enough to respond to virtually anything.m
Again, a revised PAAR is the most promising candidate. It might
counterbalance some of subchapter K's most problematic qualities
through a simple, yet expansive, directive that taxpayers comply with
all of the law, not just its literal language. If successful in fighting
2 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 59-60. As one commentator noted:
The return to simpler rules and regulations will be difficult for many practitioners
who have become accustomed to finding answers to every question. For these
practitioners, the loss of the unending stream of guidance will remove a crutch on
which they have long relied. It will also require them to exercise judgment as well as
to perform research. In the long run, however, this change will benefit both tax
practitioners and the tax system. It will restore the intellectual aspect of the practice
of tax law, in which imagination and judgment are combined to reach results for
clients which are consistent with sound tax policy. It will encourage tax practitioners
to think for themselves.
Upton, Thoughts on Hyperlexis, supra note 230, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
3 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Sheppard, Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 22, at 936-37.
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abusive partnership transactions, particularly those exploiting
still-undiscovered fault lines, a revised PAAR would also simplify
subchapter K.2 35 Neither Congress nor the Treasury would be required
to promulgate additional, targeted anti-abuse rules in response to
newly developed tax shelters.236 A revised PAAR, standing alone,
might well suffice.
Even under the worst-case scenario, a revised PAAR remains a
worthwhile endeavor with nominal downside. The regulation would
still serve as a stronger, clearer signal that transactions are improper if
they comply with the literal language of subchapter K but generate
tax consequences contrary to its overarching principles.237 Given
subchapter K's deepening crisis, the value of such a simple reminder
238
may be significant.
Before proceeding, let me emphasize one critical point. A revised
PAAR is not a panacea. It would not cure subchapter K of its decades
of remarkable dysfunction. Only fundamental reform could do that.239
To illustrate subchapter K's precarious state, consider the following
observation made by the American Law Institute after the Treasury
finalized the PAAR in 1994:
[I]t is evident that if one were writing on a clean slate, one
would not adopt a set of operating rules that first touts their
flexibility, then proceeds to restrict that flexibility with a
series of highly complex mechanical and sometimes
subjective tests, and then overlays on top of those tests a
relatively amorphous supertest authorizing the disregard of
the consequences of earlier tests despite plain compliance
with them .... Something very fundamental must be awry in
2 3 5 See NYSBA Report, supra note 33; Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 58. See
generally Surrey, supra note 231, at 694-95; David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66
U. Cmi. L. REV. 860, 870-71 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Formalism in Tax Law].236 See Weisbach, Formalism in Tax Law, supra note 235, at 870-71.
237 See Bankman Comments, supra note 48; Halperin Comments, supra note 16. See
generally Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines,
54 SMU L. REv. 9, 19 (2001); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial
Doctrines to Interpret the Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REv. 195, 208 (2001).
238 Nonetheless, one might assert that there is a more significant cost associated with a
revised PAAR: the uncertainty it would create. As will be discussed infra Part 11.C.I., this
argument is factually unproven.
2 39 See ALI MEMORANDUM No. 1, supra note 208, at 8-9; Gunn, supra note 9, at 174
("The new regulations are an addition to a deeply unsatisfactory statutory and regulatory
structure. Antiabuse rules ... may be useful adjuncts to any statutory scheme, but they cannot
be expected to transform the mess that subchapter K has become into a workable, fair, and
efficient body of law: doing that will require re-writing the statute.").
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the basic structure of the rules for the law to have evolved
into this unhappy state.240
The ALI's view of subchapter K was incredibly bleak, and the picture
has only deteriorated since that time. Thus, to the extent that revising
the PAAR might help sustain subchapter K until Congress is prepared
to tackle its fundamental reform, the Treasury should be encouraged
to act. Indeed, there is every reason to try a revised PAAR and, as will
be discussed below, no persuasive reason not to.
Further, there is little downside to the Treasury revising the
PAAR. Its revision does not trade off with alternative anti-tax shelter
initiatives within subchapter K or the federal income tax system more
broadly. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any observer chastising the
Treasury for developing too many tools in the fight against tax
shelters.
C. Objections to the Better-Built Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule
Revising the PAAR would likely reignite the controversy that has
surrounded the PAAR since its proposal sixteen years ago. The
regulation's opponents would invariably raise questions about the
uncertainty of a revised PAAR. Likewise, these opponents would
challenge the need for a special anti-abuse rule in subchapter K,
particularly in light of the government's success in fighting the last
generation of tax shelters.241 As this section explains, all of these
objections are premature and factually uncertain, with reason to doubt
their accuracy. Thus, such objections should not deter the Treasury
from revising the PAAR.
1. We Don't Want Uncertain Anti-Abuse Rules
Historically, the primary objection to the PAAR has been that it is
too uncertain.242 Opponents might maintain that a revised PAAR is
240 ALI MEMORANDUM NO. 1, supra note 208, at 8-9; Kwall, supra note 19, at 232.
241 See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
242 In addition, opponents would likely challenge a revised PAAR's validity, asserting that
it would not be a reasonable interpretation of subchapter K. See Aprill, supra note 237, at 17;
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 39 n.196. Thus, the Treasury would have to be prepared
to litigate the validity question. For excellent discussions of the final PAAR's validity, see
McKEE ET AL., TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note 78, at 1.05[5];
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 50-55. If, however, these validity concerns were
deemed sufficiently problematic, which is unlikely, Congress might consider codifying a revised
PAAR. At a minimum, codification would eliminate any questions about a revised PAAR's
validity. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Congress would codify a revised PAAR, since enacting
a broad anti-abuse rule to govern subchapter K would be a time-consuming process and would
not likely be considered a high priority by many members of Congress. See Schler, supra note 9,
at 359. Further, Congress may be particularly reluctant to codify a revised PAAR due to current
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simultaneously vague and overbroad, making it impossible to
determine whether a transaction involves legitimate tax planning or
illegitimate tax abuse.243 Notwithstanding the Treasury's intent that a
revised PAAR would apply to only a small number of abusive
transactions, its expansive language would lead to the contrary
conclusion. This uncertainty, opponents might assert, would lead to a
parade of horribles, including the diminution of commerce, the
regulation's haphazard enforcement, and the erosion of the federal
income tax system's fairness.244 Further, as empirical evidence of the
problems with broad anti-abuse rules, these opponents might point to
other nations' experiences with general anti-avoidance rules
("GAARs"), particularly Canada's experience with a GAAR.
To these opponents, this proposal likely represents a particularly
nefarious brand of anti-abuse rule. Although most critics of the
PAAR's revision likely disfavored the final PAAR, these critics
would almost invariably acknowledge that the Treasury at least tried
to make substantive changes to reduce the final regulation's
economic concerns, fearing that it would deter legitimate commercial transactions, just as the
regulation's opponents would invariably argue. Ultimately, however, this "location" question is
peripheral. What matters most is that the PAAR be reworked and the mistakes of the past be
corrected.
2 43 See Banoff, Use of Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, supra note 15, at 837; Graeme S.
Cooper, International Experience with General Anti-Avoidance Rules, 54 SMU L. REV. 83,
92-93 (2001) ("This is the standard claim that a GAAR is uncertain. It is a universal claim that
'tax avoidance' cannot be defined in a sufficiently precise verbal formula for it to be used as the
basis for the imposition of tax: that there will be too much GAAR fallout creating havoc for
unintended targets. This claim is rarely well developed; it is apparently thought sufficient
merely to assert it and its truth becomes self-evident, but how uncertain are GAARs?"
(footnotes omitted)); Weisbach, Formalism in Tax Law, supra note 235, at 861 ("A common
reaction to anti-abuse rules is horror. Anti-abuse rules seem to eliminate certainty and reliability
in the tax law."); Kenneth W. Gideon, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Address at the Laurence
Neal Woodworth Memorial Lecture, Ohio Northern Univ. Claude W. Pettit College of Law
(Nov. 23, 1998), in Tax law Works Best When the Rules are Clear, TAX NOTES TODAY, NOV.
23, 1998, 1998 TNT 225-71 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Gideon, Tax Law Works Best] ("Even more
fundamentally, the uncertain application of vague rules has the same uncontrollable
consequences of a nuclear weapon: the uncertainty afflicts everyone, not just abusers.")
244 To many readers, these objections may resemble those raised in the perennial debate
between rules and standards in the federal income tax and, more broadly, in the law. Indeed, the
Treasury's revision of the PAAR would introduce a standard into the primarily rule-based world
of subchapter K. Although the questions raised by the PAAR's revision parallel the questions
arising in the rules versus standards debate, a thorough examination of such debate is beyond
this Article's scope. For recent, thoughtful discussions of rules and standards in the federal
income tax, see generally Aprill, supra note 237; Bankman, Sociology of Tax, supra note 231;
Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131 (2001); Edward
D. Kleinbard, Corporate Tax Shelters and Corporate Tax Management, 51 TAX EXECUTIVE 235
(1999); Weisbach, Formalism in Tax Law, supra note 235. For equally thoughtful discussions
outside the federal income tax, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988).
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uncertainty. Moreover, the Service imposed enforcement
restrictions on its examiners, requiring them to obtain prior approval
246before challenging a transaction under the final PAAR. Yet a
revised PAAR would include none of these measures.
Before considering these objections, a preliminary comment on
uncertainty is warranted. Each objection starts from the premise that
uncertainty is bad, hampering subchapter K's administrability, equity,
and efficiency.247 Although a comprehensive analysis of uncertainty's
role in partnership taxation is well beyond this Article's scope, I posit
that the opposite might be correct. The introduction of greater
uncertainty into subchapter K might have a positive effect on
partnership taxation.248
Subchapter K overflows with complex and technical statutory
provisions, regulations, rulings, and other forms of administrative
guidance.249 Although intended, at least in part, to increase the
certainty of partnership taxation, these materials have also contributed
to subchapter K's deepening crisis. Likewise, the addition of
numerous technical, targeted rules has created new fault lines ripe for
exploitation by taxpayers at extraordinary public cost.2 50 Thus, one
might reasonably question the virtue of certainty in subchapter K,
245 See supra Part LC.
26 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
247 See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 237, at 21-22; Gideon, Tax Law Works Best, supra note
243 ("The basic defect of all antiabuse rules is uncertainty. There is no clear delineation
between situations in which the rule applies to deny benefits and those in which it doesn't.").
248 See Weisbach, Failure of Disclosure, supra note 17, at 81. Professor Weisbach aptly
notes that the uncertainty objection
is usually just left at that, as if it were self-evident that uncertainty is a bad thing that
should be avoided at all costs. But this is not the case .... There is a lot of literature
about the effects of uncertainty in the tax law and in other areas of law. The general
thrust is that uncertainty generally does not have uniformly bad or good effects and
that we should have no presumption that reducing uncertainty (even for free) is a
good thing. None of this literature has been incorporated into the tax shelter debate.
While uncertainty may play a role in the debate over anti-shelter doctrines, the
assumption that it is a strong argument against these doctrines is false. We cannot
say that uncertainty is necessarily bad and cannot say that we should not impose
significant uncertainty if it is needed to implement strong anti-shelter doctrines.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's
Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1072-73 (2009).
2 See sources cited supra note 231 and accompanying text.
250See, e.g., Schler, supra note 9, at 373. One commentator observed:
[Dletailed technical changes in the Code or regulations are likely to have only a
short-term ameliorative effect. The reason is that the tax shelter business attracts very
smart people who devote their days and nights to finding holes (in some cases
pinholes) in the law. The Service is always behind. Changes in the law designed to
stop abuse simply lead to more creative techniques.
Id.
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concluding that a decrease in certainty might increase subchapter K's
efficacy.
Nonetheless, let us consider the four objections to a revised PAAR
based on the regulation's perceived uncertainty. First, there would be
nothing uniquely uncertain about a revised PAAR. Indeed, the
regulation would be like any new law, regulation, or judicial
doctrine.251 Initially, the application of any change in law is uncertain,
yet greater clarity emerges over time through the federal income tax
system's elaborative process. And a revised PAAR would develop in
this manner too. There is no reason to believe that practitioners, the
Service, or the courts would have a singular blind spot with respect to
this one regulation.
Second, the parade of horribles that opponents maintain would
result from a revised PAAR's uncertainty is factually unproven and
unlikely to occur. Although the claim that such uncertainty would
lead to a diminution in commercial partnership transactions is a
perennial favorite,25 2 there is scant evidence that a revised PAAR
would hamper real commercial activity.2 53 The past sixteen years'
experience with the PAAR is illustrative. Although opponents
viciously attacked the PAAR, claiming that it would impair
commerce,254 not one legitimate transaction has been publicly
identified as failing to close because of the final PAAR's
uncertainty. 25s Given the innumerable transactions that practitioners
claimed could run afoul of the proposed PAAR,25 6 it seems likely that
a transaction that was actually aborted because of the final PAAR
251 See Bankman Comments, supra note 48.
252 See, e.g., Battle, supra note 172, at 808; Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, The Recent Evolution
of Antiabuse Rules, 66 TAX NoTEs 1189, 1191 (1995) ("But the tax system has to tolerate some
unintended results, and some abuses, because the purity of the tax system is not the most
important factor in a healthy economy. Under this holistic approach, when a distortion or abuse
gets big enough, tax officials must intercede. But efforts to 'get out in front' of tax planners can
cost the economy more than they save the fisc."); Gideon, Regulatory Guidance, supra note
204, at 639 ("[W]hat seems inevitable is that taxpayers who have partnership and
non-partnership options to accomplish the same objective must take into account the prospect of
challenge under the rule out of a concern that simply achieving an advantageous tax result in a
partnership form may be enough to trigger audit controversy."); Banoff, What's Really Wrong
with 1.701-2, supra note 175 ("Where antiabuse rules potentially apply to Middle America, so
that all but the most straightforward transactions are subjected to review and analysis by tax
counsel-thereby burdening transactions with additional professional services costs and slowing
the process for completing the transactions-it has been suggested that perhaps it is better to
tolerate some unintended results or abusive transactions, if that is the only alternative.").
253 See Schler, supra note 9, at 381 ('The level of uncertainty created by anti-abuse rules
should not be overstated. In reality, normal business transactions are not threatened by
anti-abuse rules.").
5 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
255 See Hyde Letter, supra note 194 (noting that no tax practitioner has provided an
example of a business transaction that has failed to close as a result of the final PAAR).
2
5 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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would have been widely publicized as empirical proof of the
regulation's detrimental effect on the market for partnership
transactions.
Further, the notion that the cost of partnership transactions would
increase because practitioners could not distinguish between the
proper and improper use of subchapter K is particularly unpersuasive.
Practitioners involved in tax shelter transactions unquestionably have
a keen sense of the difference between a legitimate partnership
transaction and a tax shelter.2 57 Indeed, without such knowledge,
these practitioners would be unable to provide the services for which
they are so generously compensated-structuring and opining on
partnership transactions that shade between legitimate and abusive.
Nor should other tax practitioners have difficulty distinguishing
between proper tax planning and improper tax sheltering.25 9
Practitioners' stock in trade is judgment, and they are trained to apply
the law to various factual settings and transaction structures. 260 In this
regard, a revised PAAR would be no different than the many judicial
doctrines and changes in law that lawyers grapple with daily.
In addition to its adverse effect on commerce, opponents of a
revised PAAR might argue that the regulation's uncertainty would
lead to inconsistent and subjective enforcement.2 6 1 For skeptical
observers, the resulting uneven enforcement would erode taxpayer
confidence in the federal income tax system's fairness. 262 And this
reduced confidence, in turn, would trigger decreased compliance and
increased abuse.263
257 See, e.g., Canellos, supra note 9, at 51-54.
258 See, e.g., id. at 56 ("The hard part is not finding the loophole (there are plenty around
and most have been written up). Rather, it is cloaking the shelter in the mantle of a real
transaction by incorporating the requisite economic return to satisfy a perceived 'economic
substance' minimum threshold.").
'
9 See id. at 51 ("While defining tax shelters may be difficult and while there are cases on
the borderline, experienced tax professionals can usually readily distinguish tax shelters from
real transactions."); Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW. 807,
809 (1995) ("[P]ractitioners are undoubtedly aware when a transaction is structured to achieve a
tax result inconsistent with its economic substance.").
26oSee McMahon, supra note 237, at 200 ("[U]ncertainty is the stuff of tax lawyering.");
Schler, supra note 9, at 381 ("[T]ax lawyers are familiar with unclear and ambiguous provisions
of the Code and regulations. They routinely apply such provisions in giving advice as to
whether transactions work . . . . Providing advice concerning the applicability of a broader
anti-abuse rule would not be a novel concept to tax lawyers."); Bankman Comments, supra note
48 (interpreting the intent of statutes and regulations is an "everyday task of the practicing
lawyer").
261 See Aprill, supra note 237, at 22; supra Part I.B.2.c.
262 Banoff, Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, supra note 15, at 842-43; Olson,
Observations from the Frontlines, supra note 12, at 574.
263 Olson, Observations from the Frontlines, supra note 12, at 574.
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Again, there is little factual support for the foregoing assertions.
As previously discussed, the federal income tax system is replete with
broad rules of uncertain scope, including the judicial doctrines, and
examiners routinely apply these rules without internal oversight
restrictions. 264 The Service has considerable experience applying
novel and uncertain provisions, and this experience belies the notion
that the Service would struggle to apply a revised PAAR uniformly
and objectively.265
Additionally, the enforcement restrictions currently imposed on
the final PAAR are particularly problematic.266 As a preliminary
matter, their efficacy is difficult to gauge. The little evidence
available suggests that the IRS National Office approves the
overwhelming majority of requests from examiners to apply the final
PAAR.267 But this evidence also suggests that examiners make very
few requests to apply the regulation.268 What remains unknown is
why examiners make so few requests. Are examiners simply applying
the final PAAR judiciously, or does the prior approval requirement
deter them from raising the regulation? Absent additional
information, any assessment of the impact of these enforcement
restrictions on the final PAAR remains speculative.
Nonetheless, these restrictions most certainly have a detrimental
signaling effect. Requiring examiners to seek approval before raising
the final PAAR signals to taxpayers that the Service does not trust its
examiners to apply the regulation properly, thereby adding credibility
to the urban legend of the "rogue" agent. Likewise, these enforcement
restrictions signal that the Service itself believes there is something
wrong with the final PAAR, and that only a handful of individuals
within the government understand the regulation well enough to apply
it. Taken together, these adverse signaling effects outweigh any
potential, albeit unproven, benefit that might be derived from the final
PAAR's enforcement restrictions.
264 See supra note 248 and accompanying text. Still, to the extent questions would arise
regarding a revised PAAR's application, examiners have internal avenues through which to
obtain advice and resolve such issues. See generally BITKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, supra note 37, ati 110.5; SALTZMAN, supra note 77, at 3.04.
265See Aprill, supra note 237, at 22-33. In her article, Professor Aprill traces the
Treasury's application of anti-abuse rules set forth in Sections 482 and 355, and concludes that
such application has been cautious and judicious. See id. at 33. Indeed, she notes that the history
of these rules "demonstrates how, in exercising discretion under such broad standards . .. [the]
Treasury and the IRS act in ways to make the justifications more predictable, reliable, and
certain." Id
26 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 34.
26 7 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
268See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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Most importantly, the assertion that a revised PAAR would
adversely affect the fairness of the federal income tax system is
incongruous, particularly when considered in context. Partnership tax
shelters have devastated subchapter K, costing taxpayers billions of
dollars and compromising the federal income tax system's integrity.
The Treasury's goal in revising the PAAR would be to eliminate tax
sheltering opportunities and, thus, restore fairness to the federal
income tax system. The potential loss of fairness caused by the
Service's enforcement of the revised PAAR is quite unlikely to
exceed the certain loss of fairness caused by tax shelters. Simply put,
the proliferation of abusive partnership transactions would invariably
cause greater harm to the federal income tax system than the
Service's imperfect application of a revised PAAR.26 9
Third, reliance on international experience with GAARs,
especially the Canadian GAAR, to conclude that a revised PAAR
would fail is problematic.270 Initially, it is important to note that
commentators remain divided about the Canadian GAAR's
effectiveness. Some observers consider it to be a failure that has had
little effect on the Canadian tax system.2 71 But others believe that the
Canadian GAAR, although not a universal remedy, has had a positive
impact on the nation's tax system.2 7 2 Thus, it seems premature to
draw any conclusions regarding the revised PAAR's fate based on the
Canadian GAAR.
Even if one assumes that the Canadian GAAR failed, however,
transnational comparisons are nonetheless tricky because a GAAR's
success depends heavily on variables unique to a nation's tax
system.27 3 For instance, a GAAR is influenced by a nation's "tax
culture"-the views of taxpayers, taxing authorities, and courts
269 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 58 ("In our view, however, the net increase
in uncertainty is a price worth paying in order to reassert the applicability of the judicial
doctrines as a backstop to the abuse of complex rules."); Brockway Comments, supra note 193
("I am convinced the Treasury's efforts to ensure a fair and equitable tax system cannot be left
solely to targeted anti-abuse regulations that your correspondents would endorse. The reality is
that, no matter how hard the Treasury and the IRS might try, they will only be able to identify,
analyze, and respond to a fraction of the arguably abusive transactions that are entered into.
Certainly, none of us that advise clients with respect to highly structured, tax-oriented
investments has any intention of bringing the structures to your attention.").
270 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 119 ("It is difficult from the experiences
of other countries to draw general conclusions about the efficacy of a GAAR, or its
appropriateness for the United States, because tax systems and systems of jurisprudence differ
from country-to-country."); Cooper, supra note 241, at 117-30.
271 See, e.g., Brian J. Arnold, The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General
Anti-Avoidance Rule, 52 CAN. TAX J. 488 (2004).
272 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 243, at 127-30.273 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 119-20.
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regarding taxes and tax abuse.2 74 Likewise, the judiciary's comfort
with and willingness to apply broad anti-avoidance rules plays a role
in the fate of a GAAR.2 75 Lastly, the rationale underlying a GAAR's
adoption and the terms of the GAAR itself may affect its future
success. 27 6
A cursory review of these variables highlights significant
differences between the Canadian GAAR and a revised PAAR,
thereby casting doubt on the former's evidentiary value. Prior to the
GAAR's adoption, the Canadian tax system had little experience with
overarching judicial doctrines.277 The Canadian Parliament introduced
the GAAR in response to the increasing incidence of tax shelters and
the judiciary's continued adherence to formalism. 27 8 Indeed, some
observers have posited that the Canadian Parliament had hoped to
transform Canada's tax culture through the introduction of the
GAAR. 279
The variables shaping a revised PAAR would be quite different,
making Canada's experience with the GAAR inapt. Most importantly,
a revised PAAR would not be designed to reshape the United States'
tax culture. On the contrary, the regulation would simply seek to
better align one rogue regime, subchapter K, with the nation's
existing tax culture, which is firmly rooted in notions of substance.
Broad anti-abuse principles, such as the judicial doctrines, have a
long and rich history in the federal income tax system. Although the
judiciary's commitment to these doctrines has varied over the years,
few observers would disavow their role in the federal income tax
system.
Fourth, the assertion that a revised PAAR would be especially
problematic because of the Treasury's decision to eliminate prior
palliative measures is overstated. As previously discussed, many of
the final PAAR's features that were designed to ameliorate its
uncertainty were counterproductive, ultimately contributing to the
274 See Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits
of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 119, 121-24 (2005).
2 7 5 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 120.
276 Cooper, supra note 243, at 85.
277 Indeed, in 1984, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the principle that a transaction
must have a business purposes to be respected. Stubart Invs. Ltd v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.C.R
536, 580 (Can.) ("[W]here the substance of the Act, when the clause in question is contextually
construed, is clear and unambiguous and there is no prohibition in the Act which embraces the
taxpayer, the taxpayer shall be free to avail himself of the beneficial provision in question.");
see also Arnold, supra note 271, at 488 (noting that the Canadian GAAR was adopted in
response to the Stubart Court's rejection of the business purpose test).
278 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 122.
"
9 See Lee A. Sheppard, China Tries a GAAR, 123 TAx NOTES 523 (2009).
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regulation's failure. 28 0 In revising the PAAR, the Treasury would seek
to correct those mistakes by unshackling the PAAR. The revised
PAAR would, for the first time, develop through the common law
elaborative process. By releasing the revised PAAR from the
Treasury's prior failed efforts to achieve greater certainty, the revised
PAAR might paradoxically become more certain. At the very least,
the magnitude and effects of any increased uncertainty are themselves
quite uncertain.
If, however, the government wanted to address these opponents'
uncertainty concerns more proactively, there is a relatively easy and
effective way to do this. The Service could initiate an advance ruling
procedure designed to address taxpayer issues regarding the
application of a revised PAAR.2 81 Such a procedure would offer
taxpayers an expedited means of determining whether the regulation
applied to their transactions without compromising the Service's need
for flexibility in combating abusive partnership transactions. To this
end, the risk of compliance with a revised PAAR would remain
entirely on the taxpayer. Thus, the only taxpayers that would likely
take advantage of this procedure are those engaging in legitimate
partnership transactions. As previously discussed, taxpayers engaging
in abusive partnership transactions are unlikely to want or need
additional guidance.2 82
2. We Don't Need Redundant Anti-Abuse Rules
If the Treasury were to revise the PAAR, a different objection
would likely emerge. The regulation's opponents would likely assert
28See supra Part II.C.
281 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, Search for a Silver Bullet, supra note 18, at 1960. In
addition, an advance ruling procedure is not without precedent. Specifically, taxpayers can enter
into advance pricing agreements with the Service under Section 482, which authorizes the
Service to reallocate tax items among two or more business entities under common ownership
or control whenever necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly to reflect
income. LR.C. § 482 (2006). For a more detailed discussion of Section 482 and transfer pricing
generally, see BrrTKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 37, at 79.1.1.
Advance pricing agreements allow the taxpayer and the Service to agree in advance on the best
transfer pricing method to be used for transactions specified in the agreement. See Rev. Proc.
2006-9, 2006-1 C.B. 278 (revised by Rev. Proc. 2008-31, 2008-23 I.R.B. 1133). In doing so, the
advance pricing agreement program aims to resolve taxpayer disputes cooperatively and
prospectively rather than through the traditional audit process. Id.; see also I.R.S.
Announcement 2009-28, 2009-15 I.R.B. 760, 766 tbl.1 (IRS Annual Report Concerning
Advance Pricing Agreements and APA Program). For a more detailed discussion of advance
pricing agreements, see BITKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 37, at
79.14.
282See Chirelstein & Zelenak, Search for a Silver Bullet, supra note 18, at 1960 ("In
reality, of course, this approach would call the bluff of those who complain about uncertainty
but whose real interest is in being able to play the audit lottery without risk of penalty."); see
also supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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that the Service's current arsenal of anti-tax shelter tools is sufficient
to fight abusive partnership transactions and, therefore, a revised
283PAAR would be redundant. Although tax shelters remain an
enduring problem of the federal income tax system, the government
ultimately quelled the most recent generation of abusive transactions
through the application of a series of tools, including the judicial
doctrineS284 and an enhanced disclosure regime. 285 Even Congress
experienced a critical shift in thinking about tax shelters, which has
resulted in the enactment of numerous anti-abuse provisions 286 and
287
may result in the codification of the economic substance doctrine.
283 Some might even go a step further, proclaiming that "[t]he tax shelter war is over. The
government won." Olson, Observations from the Frontlines, supra note 12, at 567. In recent
years, this has been an all too common refrain because the government has experienced
incredible success in combating the last generation of tax shelters. See, e.g., Coder, supra note
12 (recounting the views of Donald Korb, outgoing I.R.S. Chief Counsel, that the Treasury has
turned the corner on corporate tax shelters). But the tax shelter war is not over. Although the
market for abusive transactions is currently quiet, a lull in the action should not be confused
with an end to hostilities. The tax shelter industry suffered a tremendous blow, but it has proven
to be a nimble and adaptive adversary. Further, the current economic crisis has assuredly
reduced the demand for tax shelters. Taxpayers are suffering incredible losses; there is little
need to purchase losses, deductions, and credits in the tax shelter market. Make no mistake,
however, bankers and lawyers high atop Wall Street (or deep in the trenches beneath the
Chicago loop, as has been suggested by one commentator) are currently developing the next big
tax shelter. See Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Shelters: More Plain Brown Wrappers, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Apr. 17, 2000, 2000 TNT 74-6 (LEXIS). There is simply no reason to believe
that, with the passage of time and the improvement of the economy, the tax shelter industry will
not return to its innovative and daring ways. See Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 12, at 1391
("Shelters may not reemerge as a major problem soon, both because the forces noted above
should continue to operate and, regrettably, because there may not be much income needing
sheltering for the next few years. It would be a major mistake, however, to assume that the tax
shelter dragon has been slain once and for all.").
284 See Olson, Observations from the Frontlines, supra note 12, at 569 ("[The courts
backstopped the Service's efforts, not quite universally, but with more than enough frequency
for taxpayers to realize the courts were an unreliable refuge.").
285 See Canellos, supra note 9, at 70-71; Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence:
Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX. L. REv. 255, 286 (2002); Olson, Observations from the
Frontlines, supra note 12, at 569. Although disagreeing with the conclusion that strong
disclosure is sufficient to successfully combat tax shelters, one scholar described the argument
for disclosure as follows:
[Tihe economics of the shelter industry rely on the audit lottery rather than on
substantive tax law. Taxpayers compare the probability of being caught and the cost
of being caught with the potential tax savings .... If we believe courts generally can
differentiate between permissible, aggressive tax planning and impermissible tax
shelters, we can change these odds without changing substantive law. Disclosure
increases the chance of being caught and penalties create a cost to being caught.
Properly structured disclosure and penalties should be sufficient and a new
substantive disallowance rule is not needed.
Weisbach, Failure of Disclosure, supra note 17, at 73. For a detailed discussion of the current
disclosure regime, see SALTZMAN, supra note 77, atI 7B.16[3][a]-[b].
286See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833, 188 Stat.
1418, 1589-92 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(C), 734(b), (d), 743(b), (d)).
2
8 See Jeremiah Coder, Administration Supports Codification of Economic Substance,
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To these opponents, existing anti-tax shelter tools, plus the potential
addition of a codified economic substance doctrine, are sufficient to
combat future abusive partnership transactions. Hence, revising the
PAAR would be unnecessary.
Before addressing the substance of the redundancy objection,
readers will notice a tension between this objection and the
uncertainty objection previously discussed. The uncertainty objection
posits that the PAAR's revision would create chaos in subchapter K,
deterring taxpayers from using partnerships and diminishing the
fairness of the federal income tax system. That is, this objection
predicts that a revised PAAR would have a profoundly negative
impact on the federal income tax system. On the contrary, the
redundancy objection maintains that revising the PAAR would have
little effect because the federal income tax system already
accomplishes the goals that the Treasury would set for a revised
PAAR. Taken together, these objections are difficult to reconcile and,
thus, raise the possibility that revising the PAAR could be just the
right remedial measure for subchapter K.
Notwithstanding this contradiction, the redundancy argument is
unpersuasive. First, recent congressional efforts to combat partnership
tax shelters have been counterproductive. The statutory anti-abuse
rules added to subchapter K during the past decade have been
technical, narrowly tailored provisions.28 8 As a result, the complexity
of these provisions has only exacerbated subchapter K's deepening
crisis. 2 89 Because these provisions typically apply to such a narrow
range of transactions, their structural costs far outweigh any benefits
achieved through the elimination of abuse. Thus, Congress's recent
willingness to combat partnership tax shelters through targeted
Treasury Official Says, TAX NOTEs TODAY, June 16, 2009, 2009 TNT 113-4 (LEXIS); Amy S.
Elliot, Debate Is Over on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, Treasury Official Says,
TAx NoTEs TODAY, Oct. 2, 2009, 2009 TNT 189-2 (LEXIS) ("Joshua Odintz, acting Treasury
tax legislative counsel, said that 'the debate is effectively over' about whether there should be
codification of the economic substance doctrine and that he imagines Congress will pass
codification in the next few years."). For a discussion of the most recent codification proposal,
see infra note 297 and accompanying text.
288 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C) (2006) (providing a special rule for allocations
attributable to property contributing with a built-in loss); § 734(b), (d) (2006) (mandating basis
adjustments if there is a substantial basis reduction with respect to a distribution); § 743(b), (d)
(2006) (mandating basis adjustments if the partnership has a substantial built-in loss
immediately following the transfer of a partnership interest).
m
9 For a discussion of one such change, Section 704(c)(1)(C), and the confusion it has
created, see Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered Ceilings, and the
Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 1381 (2009), and Daniel L. Simmons,
Built-in Gain and Built-in Loss Property on Formation of a Partnership: An Exploration of the
Grand Elegance of Partnership Capital Accounts, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 599, 661-86 (2009).
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statutory anti-abuse provisions has not rendered a revised PAAR
superfluous.29 0
Second, the potential codification of the economic substance
doctrine would not eliminate the need for a revised PAAR. As a
preliminary matter, Congress has yet to codify the economic
substance doctrine and, thus, this argument is premature. Although
the likelihood of congressional action has increased,29t Congress has
flirted with codifying economic substance for almost a decade.292 Yet
the doctrine remains uncodified.293
Even if Congress were to codify the economic substance doctrine,
this should not deter the Treasury from revising the PAAR. Let's
assume that Congress ultimately enacts an economic substance
provision resembling the proposal currently under consideration.294 In
basic terms, if a court determines that the application of the economic
substance doctrine is appropriate, then this proposal would require the
29 0 The same can be said of Congress's commitment to combat tax shelters. In recent years,
Congress has demonstrated a renewed vigor in the fight against tax shelters. But Congress is
fickle, and its desire to combat tax shelters ebbs and flows with the political climate. Indeed,
Congress's appetite for combating tax shelters may be waning in light of the current economic
crisis. Members of both congressional tax-writing committees recently sent a letter to Douglas
Shulman, Commissioner of the Service, requesting relief for small business owners subject to
significant penalties for their participation in tax shelters. See Letter from Sen. Max Baucus et
al. to Douglas H. Schulman, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv. (June 12, 2009), reprinted in
Taxwriters Seek To Curb Listed Transaction Penalties on Small Businesses, TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 15, 2009, 2009 TNT 113-25 (LEXIS). In response, the Service announced that it
would not seek to collect certain penalties from small businesses that had previously engaged in
listed transactions until December 31, 2009. See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Extends Suspension of
Listed Transaction Disclosure Penalty, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 25, 2009, 2009 TNT 184-1
(LEXIS); see also Michael Joe, Shulman Suspends Collection of Some Tax Shelter Penalties as
Lawmakers Plan Legislative Fix, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 8, 2009, 2009 TNT 128-2 (LEXIS).
291 The Obama administration supports codification of the economic substance doctrine.
See sources cited supra note 287. This is in marked contrast to the Bush administration's
opposition to codification of the doctrine. See OFFICE OF MGT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY, H.R. 2419 - FOOD AND ENERGY
SECuRrrY ACT OF 2007, at 3 (2007) (opposing codification of the economic substance doctrine
in the Food and Energy Security Act of 2007).
2 See Lee A. Shepparl, Turning Japanese: Federal Policy Prolongs Bank Crisis, 123
TAX NOTES 657, 658 (2009) (noting that an economic substance proposal has been "kicking
around" for years); Clinton Stretch et al., Economic Substance and Strict Liability Do Not Mix,
TAX NOTES TODAY, June 16, 2009, 2009 TNT 113-11 (LEXIS) (noting that efforts to codify the
economic substance doctrine have intensified over the past seven years).
293 The codification of the economic substance doctrine has generated much controversy
over the past decade. See, e.g., Monte A. Jackel, Farming for Economic Substance: Codification
Fails to Bear Fruit, 119 TAX NOTES 59, 59-60 (2008); Sheryl Stratton & Karla L. Miller, To
Codify Is to Ossify, IRS Official Says on Economic Substance, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 20,
2003, 2003 TNT 119-6 (LEXIS); see also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Summary Report
on the Provisions of Recent Senate Bills That Would Codify the Economic Substance Doctrine,
reprinted in NYBSA Objects to Codification of Economic Substance Provisions, TAX NOTES
TODAY, May 28, 2003, 2003 TNT 102-19 (LEXIS).
294 See Affordable Healthcare for America Act, H.R. 3692, 111th Cong. § 562 (2009).
464 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2
court to use a uniform, statutory definition of economic substance.295
Under this codified version of economic substance, a court would still
have to engage in a fact-intensive analysis of the underlying
transaction in order to determine whether the economic substance
doctrine is applicable. Yet it is this analysis that has proven so
296
unpredictable in litigating partnership tax shelters. Additional
problems emerge if we further assume that a codified economic
substance doctrine would exclude various transactions from its
application.297 The codified doctrine would become more complex,
and its exceptions would likely provide a roadmap to future abusive
298transactions.
Third, the recent success of various anti-tax shelter tools does not
eliminate the need to revise the PAAR. For instance, the judicial
doctrines remain unpredictable, experiencing periods of both robust
and limited application by the courts.2 99 Different views of judicial
role may affect a court's willingness to extend these doctrines into
novel contexts where a taxpayer technically complies with subchapter
K, but violates its intent.3 Similarly, disclosure rules are not assured
295 See id. § 562(a). Specifically, a transaction will only be deemed to have economic
substance if the following two requirements are satisfied: "(A) the transaction changes in a
meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering
into such transaction." Id.
296See Donald Korb, Codification of the Judicial Economic Substance Doctrine, in 852
TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCTURINGS 377, 394 (P.L.I. 2008) ("Because the
court must still review the transactions 'for what they are': The cheap, easy way out that
codification of the economic purpose doctrine might seem to offer is no way out at all.").
29 7 See Farm, Nutrition and Bioenergy Act of 2007, S. 2242, 110th Cong., ist Sess. § 511
(2007) (proposed Section 7701(p)); see also S. REP. NO. 110-206, at 92-3 (2007). The legislative
history to this codification proposal provides that "this provision is not intended to alter the tax
treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under longstanding judicial and
administrative practice are respected, merely because the choice between meaningful economic
alternatives is largely or entirely based on comparative tax advantages." S. REP. No. 110-206, 92
(2007). To illustrate, the report contains a non-exclusive list of basic structuring techniques that
should not violate the economic substance doctrine, including: (1) capitalizing an enterprise
with debt or equity, (2) making a foreign investment through a foreign corporation or a domestic
corporation, (3) entering into a transaction that constitutes a corporate organization or
reorganization, and (4) using a related party entity in a transaction, so long as such transaction
satisfies Section 482 and other applicable standards. Id., at 92-93. See generally Jackel, supra
note 293.
298 See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 237, at 208 ("A complicated comprehensive
codification of the anti-abuse rules inevitably would include numerous safe harbors and
examples of non-abusive transactions. And most, if not all, of those safe harbors would have the
potential to metamorphose into yet another tax shelter transaction.").
299 See McMahon, supra note 237; Weisbach, Failure of Disclosure, supra note 17, at
75-77.
mSee Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 8, at 4; Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 12, at
1391 ("Tax shelters could return-perhaps with a vengeance-if the federal judiciary were to
become less receptive to the government's invocation of the various common-law antiabuse
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to halt the spread of future partnership tax shelters. Taxpayers are
likely to adapt to the current disclosure rules, as they have adapted to
previous changes in law. For some taxpayers, this may mean
becoming more efficient in disclosing transactions, thereby freeing up
additional time to focus on tax planning.301 For others, this may mean
developing novel ways to obfuscate suspect transactions. 30 2 Simply
put, past success in the fight against tax shelters may not be predictive
of future success.
CONCLUSION
Subchapter K is failing. Its ailments are legendary: the allegiance
to flexibility, the matchless complexity, and the limited enforcement
resources. And the consequences have been ruinous. Subchapter K
has become a breeding ground for some of the most egregious tax
shelters, costing the general public billions of dollars and
compromising the integrity of the federal income tax system.
Remarkably, the most promising candidate to sustain subchapter K
is perhaps its least successful, most controversial provision-the
PAAR. Despite the regulation's infamous, much publicized failure, a
revised PAAR could more effectively challenge partnership tax
shelters and provide subchapter K with much needed structural
support. Thus, this Article suggests that the Treasury rework the
PAAR, correcting the mistakes made in the months following the
regulation's proposal. In doing so, the Treasury would return the
PAAR to its roots as a broad anti-abuse rule, reminding taxpayers that
partnership transactions, like all transactions, must comply with the
foundational principles that undergird the federal income tax system.
While the PAAR's longstanding opponents will invariably
question the wisdom of revising the PAAR, these scholars' and
practitioners' concerns are speculative and there is reason to doubt
their ultimate persuasiveness. What is certain, however, is subchapter
K's deepening crisis. And a revised PAAR seems likely to help curb
this crisis while risking little downside. Given the disastrous state of
doctrines.").
301 See Olson, Observations from the Frontlines, supra note 12, at 567.
0 See Blank, supra note 17, at 1641-42. Equally problematic, disclosure rules are only as
effective as the enforcement regime undergirding them and as the judiciary's commitment to
eliminating tax shelters. See Eustice, supra note 8, at 153, 161; Schler, supra note 9, at 362-63;
Weisbach, Failure of Disclosure, supra note 17, at 74. As previously discussed, the enforcement
resources dedicated to subchapter K are woefully insufficient. See sources cited supra note 7
and accompanying text. Whether subchapter K's enforcement regime can effectively and
reliably use the information obtained through disclosure to fight abusive partnership transactions
remains uncertain.
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subchapter K and the extraordinary public cost of tax shelters, the
time has come for the Treasury to answer one of the most intriguing
tax questions never asked: can the partnership anti-abuse rule really
stop partnership tax abuse?
